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(Sgd.)
Date 2/11/76

YEAR STAMP 1974

H.M. DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

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① – (100)

# FILE No. NBR 10/1 (Part A)

# TITLE: ARMS SALES FROM UK TO IRAQ

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YEAR STAMP 1974

PART A

FILE No. NBR 10/1

Enter resubmit.

①

RB 2/1

**British Embassy**
**Tehran**

Good!

8 JAN [illegible]

NBR10/1

Your reference

Our reference 10/8

Date 31 December 1973

G S Burton
MED
FCO

Dear Graham,

POSSIBLE SALE OF HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ NBR10/5 (37) 1973

1. Thank you for your letter of 13 December.

2. The Ambassador took the opportunity of his farewell audience with the Shah to raise this question. The Ambassador said that, in line with the frankness which now characterised our exchanges, he would like to have his reactions to this. Iraq had, of course, quite an important economic potential for Britain, and if we turned down such a request, our commercial presence there might be prejudiced, not to mention the prospect of resuming diplomatic relations (about which the Shah and the Ambassador had previously been speaking). In any case, if the Iraqis really wanted to fit these hovercraft with missiles, which was possible, they would probably do better by obtaining more military-type craft from Russia, like the six OSA's they already had.

? not seen report.

3. The Shah said he saw no objection. He did not fear an Iraqi land threat of any kind; it was the TU 22s and the air missile threat to Abadan which were dangerous. He had told Kosygin that if Iraq struck at Abadan, he would hit the Iraqis with everything he had. Perhaps this had been a mistake, as it may have led the Russians to give the most sophisticated weapons to the Iraqis - some of them more sophisticated than the Egyptians had.

4. So the Shah has given the green light.

Yours ever
Hugh Arbuthnott

H J Arbuthnott

cc: P G De Courcy Ireland Esq
KUWAIT

H B Walker Esq
JEDDA

COVERING SECRET

Reference

P.A. on Defence Sales to Iraq. ②

14/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
14 JAN 1974
NBR10/1

Mrs Long

Mr Hope - separate copies

Mr Muir

Mr Raftery, MED ✓

DEFENCE SALES TO THE MIDDLE EAST

1. You will recall that a couple of months ago we asked the Ministry of Defence to check up-to-date lists of equipment which we have sold or agreed to sell to the following countries: Egypt, Libya, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon.

2. We have now received back from DS13 in MOD their revised lists. I attach the relevant extract for countries for which you are responsible.

P M Nixon
Near East & North
Africa Department

11 January 1974

COVERING SECRET

## IRAQ

### A Orders completed since January 1971

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | 3 Norman Britton Islander Aircraft | |
| 2. | Bomb Disposal Equipment ( see section B ) | |
| 3. | Bomb Ejector Release Cartridges | |
| 4. | 50 Tank Transporters | £1.4m |

### B Orders secured and delivery in train

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Bomb Disposal Equipment ( £23,440 outstanding ) | £112,381 |

### C Orders secured but deliveries not yet in train

Nil

### D Equipment under negotiation or for which there are good prospects

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | Bomb Disposal Equipment | £286,000 |

### E Equipment which has been approved for direct sale but for which interest is not currently being shown

* 1. 12-50 Sea King helicopters

* 2. 40 Strikemaster Aircraft

* 3. Vosper Thorneycraft patrol boats.

NOTE

1. We have no knowledge of items marked * which were on the original list.

③

**From: P D Brittain, AD/Sales 1B**

LH 384D

Mr Burton: I don't see any reason for preventing the visit.
PG 9/1

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone [illegible]
Direct line: [illegible]4707.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
15 JAN 1974

Peter Williams, Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Your reference
NBR 10/1

Our reference
D/Sales/113/73/1

Date
7th January, 1974

NBR 10/1
pa

Dear Williams.

I mentioned to you the other day that Hawker Siddeley would like to respond to a request from Iraq that they should send out a couple of technicians to report on the state of 10 Chipmunk aircraft. You suggested that I should drop you a line about it.

The Chipmunk is, of course, an ab initio trainer. HSA supplied 21 to the Iraqi Air Force between 1951 and 1954. The 10 we are concerned with were handed over some time ago, perhaps along with others, to an Aero Club which we understand is funded by the Government and under some form of Ministry of Defence control. Perhaps this is no more than one would expect.

HSA would like to respond to this request. It is good of them to consult us: I am sure they do not really need to; but our relations with them are of the best and it would, I think, be a helpful gesture in ~~the~~ difficult times if we were not to discourage the visits proposed. Doubtless they would consult us again if they came to the point of being invited to send a further team to undertake the refurbishment.

Yours sincerely

Peter Brittain

4

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
15 JAN 1974

MBR10/1

P D Brittain Esq
Ministry of Defence (Sales)
AD/Sales 1B
Stuart House
23/25 Soho Square
London W1V 5FJ

Your reference

Our reference

Date 11 January 1974

15/1
pa

HAWKER SIDDELEY/CHIPMUNK AIRCRAFT

1 Thank you for your letter of 7 January.

2 I am writing to confirm that we see no objection to the proposed visit taking place.

P K Williams
Middle East Department

NBR10/1 ⑤
(9/1974)

Folio ⑤ transferred to NBP10/2

⑥

~~Copy - [illegible]~~
copy on NBK10/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
21 JAN 1974
NBR10/1

TOP COPY

MMEDIATE
R 253

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A
FROM KUWAIT200635Z JAN
CONFIDENTIAL
TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 76 OF 19 JAN 74 REPEATED FOR INFO TO
ROUTINE TEHRAN AND JEDDA
YOUR TEL 24:

Mr. Burton. We discussed. 22/1

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

1. AS YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM MY 170815Z JAN TO JONES , DEFENCE SALES, WE DO AT LAST APPEAR TO HAVE INSPIRED IN GENERAL MUBARAK'S MIND AT LEAST A BELIEF IN THE HOVERCRAFT AS THE MOST IF NOT THE ONLY , SUITABLE , VEHICLE FOR AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE IN THE BUBIYAN-WARBA AREA. ALL OUR ARGUMENTS WILL BE TURNED AGAINST US IF WE NOW SELL HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ. THE KUWAITIS WILL NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY VERSIONS. THEY WILL SEE US SUPPLYING IRAQ WITHA A WEAPON WHICH HAS NO RELEVANCE TO THE ISRAELI BATTLE, ONLY TO THEIR OWN DISPUTE WITH IRAQ. I WOULD EXPECT THIS TO JEOPARDISE THEIR APPARENT PLAN TO PLACE AT ANY RATE THEIR NAVAL ORDERS WITH US SEMICOLON AND TO UNDERMINE THEIR CONFIDENCE IN KELLY IN PARTICULAR AND KLT IN GENERAL AS ADVISERS ON THE THEIR DEFENCE REQUIREMENTS.

2. I APPRECIATE THAT IN MANY RESPECTS IRAQ MUST BE REGARDED AS A BETTER LONG-TERM BET THAN KUWAIT BUT IN THE SHORT TERM I WOULD NOT CONSIDER THE RISKS OF SELLING HOVERCRAFT TO IRAQ AS ACCEPTABLE.

3. IF NEVERTHELESS YOU FEEL UNABLE TO REFUSE A LICENCE I WOULD PREFER YOUR COURSE B. MAKING THE APPROACH TO SHAIKH SA'AD. IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PUT IN ALL THE TECHNICAL EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THESE WERE CIVILIAN CRAFT, AND ANY TECHNICAL OBSTACLES TO CONVERSION. I HOPE THAT OUR APPROACH TO THE KUWAITIS COULD BE MADE SUFFICIENTLY EARLY TO GIVE US TIME TO RECONSIDER , IF WE THOUGHT IT DESIRABLE, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR REACTION.

WILTON

FILES
MED
ENR
NENAD
MR WEIR
MR TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

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23 JAN 1974
NBR10/1.

(NB) 7

GR 230
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CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 181750Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY KUWAIT TELNO.024 OF 18 JANUARY 1974 INFO TEHRAN, JEDDA.

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ: DE COURCY IRELAND'S LETTER TO BURTON 22 DEC.

1. HM AMBASSADOR, TEHRAN RAISED THIS POSSIBLE SALE WITH THE SHAH WHO SAW NO OBJECTION TO OUR CONCLUDING SUCH A DEAL. HM EMBASSY JEDDA CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD NOT CREATE ANY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES THERE. PROVIDED THAT THERE ARE NOT INSURMOUNTABLE DIFFICULTIES WITH KUWAIT WE PROPOSE THEREFORE TO RECOMMEND GRANTING BHC LICENCE.

2. BEFORE DOING SO, WE NEED TO ASSESS CAREFULLY ANY ADVERSE EFFECT TO OUR GENERAL BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH KUWAIT AND SPECIFICALLY OF OUR PROSPECTS FOR THE CONCLUSION OF OIL DEALS. IF WE AGREE TO THE SALE, WE SEE TWO POSSIBLE WAYS OF PROCEEDING:

(A) TO WAIT FOR THE KUWAITIS TO RAISE THE MATTER AND THEN STRESS TO THEM THAT THE HOVERCRAFT ARE REQUIRED FOR PURELY CIVILIAN PURPOSES AS FERRIES AND THAT THE TENDER SPECIFICATIONS SUPPORT THIS: OR

(B) TO TELL THEM IN ADVANCE THAT WE INTEND MAKING THIS SALE AND TO EXPLAIN AS IN (A).

WE WONDER, HOWEVER, IF ACTION AS IN (B) ABOVE WOULD NOT TEND TO AROUSE KUWAITI SUSPICIONS THAT THE DEAL WAS NOT AS ''CLEAN'' AS WE WERE CLAIMING.

3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON POSSIBLE KUWAITI REACTIONS AND ON HOW, IF APPROVED, THE DEAL SHOULD BE PRESENTED TO THEM. BHC ARE PRESSING FOR A DECISION AND WE WOULD WELCOME A REPLY BY 21 JANUARY.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES:

| | |
|---|---|
| MED | MR WEIR |
| ENERGY D | MR TAYLOR |
| NENAD | |

CONFIDENTIAL

10WS/HSP

(8)

239A

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

BRITISH COMMERCIAL OFFICE
BAGHDAD

A F Collings Esq
Section 3
CESB
DTI
Export House
50 Ludgate Hill
London EC4M 7HU

A/BRI hc

16 December 1973

Hovercraft for Iraq.

1. We are sending to EIS today a tender notice, No. 105/73, from the Iraqi Ports Administration for the supply of three 50 passenger and two twelve passenger hovercraft. We have sent to Basra for the tender documents, but several local agents have already got copies and have been in touch with the British Hovercraft Corporation.

2. I was about to draft an EISER telegram on the above on 12 December when I received an unexpected visit by Messrs. Robinson and Stone of the British Hovercraft Corporation, who had been invited to come to Iraq by the Iraqi Military Attaché in Brussels. The Iraqi Ministry of Defence are interested in aquiring the following:-

BHC Winchester Class Mk. 3 and 4 Version Small
BHC Winchester Class SR N6 Military (Middle)
BHC Wellington (BHT) - Big
Vosper Thornycroft FPB - Big

3. Numbers required are not known to me. We made an appointment for Robinson and Stone to see Colonel Nahi of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, Armed and Supply Department. Next day they went to Basra to see the Iraqi Ports Authority, and I have not yet seen them back in Baghdad. They said they would call again on me before returning to the UK.

4. As the possibilities of British-made Iraqi Hovercraft operating in the Upper Gulf and the Shatt Al Arab may be of wider interest I am copying this letter to Gardiner in CRE Dept., DTI; Burton in Middle East Dept., FCO; Scott in ECGD; and the Directorate of Sales (1) Defence Sales Organisation, Ministry of Defence.

P. Donovan.

9

DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
ABELL HOUSE JOHN ISLIP STREET
LONDON SW1P 4LN
01-834 4422 x 376.

Our Ref: AW/59/085

9th January 1974

Mr. P. D. Brittain,
AD Sales 1B,
MOD(PE),
Stuart House, Soho Square,
LONDON W.1.

RECEIVED SALES
10 JAN 1974
REGISTRY

Dear Mr. Brittain,

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

You have asked for advice on the resources involved in conversion of civil hovercraft of SRN6 and CC7 type to military use from the points of view of:

a. ease of conversion
b. time required to convert
c. resources necessary

Obviously the answers depend upon the modification state at beginning and end of the process. No fully armed hovercraft has yet been built; LMGs are fitted to some craft. The 2 existing military CC7s for the British Army, for example, are modified relatively little from the 3 civil craft so far built; the craft are small and light, and are used as personnel carriers or reconnaissance vehicles. The main changes are the fitting of Army communications equipment and the reduction of seating on account of the greater consequent unladen weight. A more recent and hence more powerful engine was fitted, but this would now constitute the normal civil standard. No armament is fitted; if it were, it would reduce the seating still further. Overall, one could say that a civil CC7 would be no more and no less easily converted than would a fast pleasure boat. Two or three weeks work by radio fitters would cover most of the effort needed. The standard civilian CC7 is an eight seat craft. All production craft have transport joints in the hull, which enables an additional 64 inch length section to be fitted, this stretched version increases the seating to 14, with little degradation of performance. (To date no stretched version has been built.)

The SRN 6 has several military versions, one of which (the vehicle carrying SRN 6 Mk5) requires major structural modifications for which the expertise probably only exists at Cowes. Other military versions have a widened front door (which could be specified by a civil purchaser), a strengthened roof forward with gunning or observation dome, and a "soft top" through which cargo can be lowered. None of these modifications could be completed quickly; even at the factory, probably 3-4 months by a team of skilled metal workers would be needed. The result would again be a logistic or reconnaissance craft rather than a fighting vehicle.

Yours sincerely,

J. W. Leach.

J. W. Leach,
Hov. B.

c.c. Wing Cdr. A.I. Alder - MD Sid.

G. BURTON ESQ.

WITH COMPLIMENTS

Ivan Scott

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
30 JAN 1974
NBP 10/1

**EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT**
**P.O. BOX NO. 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE,**
**ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL**

**From:** P J James, Defence Sales Organisation
LH 384D

W9

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone ~~01-437 0288 ext~~ Direct Line 01 632 4709
Switchboard 01 632 3333

---

Mr G Burton
Near East and North Africa Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LondonSW1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
30 JAN 1974

NBP 10/1

Your reference

Our reference
Sales 1b/Lebanon

Date
21 January 1974

---

Dear Graham,

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

We spoke recently about the probability of converting civil hovercraft to a military application, and I can do no better than attach a copy of a letter which has been received from the Department of Trade and Industry.

I am sure that this is the information that you require.

Yours sincerely,

Enc

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REGISTRY No 35
30 JAN 1974
NBR 10/1

Mr J L Taylor

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

Flag A 1. MED intend to submit to Mr Weir shortly recommending that British Hovercraft Corporation Ltd should be given a licence to export five hovercraft to Iraq.

2. Jedda, Tehran and Kuwait were consulted. Jedda and Tehran reported that they could see no objection to the sale: Kuwait felt that the sale should not be approved at present. With Mr Egerton's approval we pointed out to MED our anxiety that this sale could have unfortunate consequences on our talks with the Kuwaitis on a long-term oil deal. MED agreed to put the latest position to the Ambassador in Kuwait and ask for a further assessment. The Ambassador has now replied, again recommending that the sale should not be permitted but avoiding any reference to oil. The British Hovercraft Corporation are pressing MED for a reply (I understand that the matter has been outstanding for some time) and MED intend to put up their submission without altering their recommendation.

Flag B
Flag C

3. Although Kuwait have not mentioned oil I still have reservations about the proposed sale. It would be difficult to stop it now; but before the Department concurs, I should be glad to know your views.

N M Fenn

N M Fenn
Energy Department

21 January 1974

Copy to: Mr T Clark, MED

Mr Clark

I find it difficult to imagine any grounds which we could give to the Iraqis or the exporters for a refusal. I agree that if the Kuwaitis are angered and upset, this could have adverse effects on Kuwaiti attitudes to the oil companies & BP in particular, & make them less amenable to reason over price. If it were possible, I would wish at any rate to avoid any publicity while the participation talks are in progress (they will of course affect the outcome in all the gulf states) But for the rest I think we will have to rely on presentation as a commercial deal to a commercial customer for commercial purposes. Can we avoid publicity for a while?

Mr. Burton

1. I suggest we hold this over to Mr. Wright's return. He will have discussed the subject in Kuwait.
2. In the meantime pl. consider Mr Taylor's query.

22/1

Mr Burton
Mr Williams
Mr Wright

Mr Gask

fn 30/1 I agree with the line proposed in para 2 of Mr Burton's minute - but think we must be careful not to promise a favourable decision only a rapid one.

REGISTRY No 35
- 4 FEB 1974
NBR 10/1

## HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

1. By arrangement with DTI (Hovercraft Division and CRE4), I telephoned the Managing Director of British Hovercraft, Mr R Stanton-Jones, in order to establish the company's policy towards the deals for Iraq and Kuwait. Hitherto, all I had been able to learn through DTI was that British Hovercraft viewed both contracts as of equal importance.

2. Mr Stanton-Jones was in no doubt about the relative merits of the two sales prospects. Rather surprisingly, he attached priority to Kuwait, his reasons being that this customer was known to the company; a firm requirement for Hovercraft has been stated, the deal is bigger and the terms under a Government-to-Government sale present a minimum of risks. On the other hand, the Iraq proposal is fraught with difficulties for British Hovercraft; the customer is an unknown quantity and the terms of the tender are swingeing and they call for unconditional guarantees for which ECGD are unable to provide cover.

3. British Hovercraft's intention in the circumstances is to try to keep the sale with Iraq alive while continuing with Kuwait. If Kuwait were to react adversely, they would be ready to sacrifice the Iraq sale provided Kuwait were to sign up. Mr Stanton-Jones confirmed that the Iraq tenders were due to be submitted on 6 February. British Hovercraft could not submit on the present Iraqi terms and in the absence of ECGD cover. His tactic therefore will be to present to the Iraqis a proposal set out on the general lines of the Iraqi terms but containing the standard Hovercraft terms of contract. He hopes that this will be acceptable to the Iraqis in place of a tender and that both parties can move on from there to detailed negotiations over terms. The risk involved in this tactic is that a competitor may accept the Iraqi terms and tender accordingly, in which case ~~it~~ would presumably get the contract. Naturally he is banking on this not happening, though he fears that the French company might be in a position to do so because the French Government are more adventurous in providing cover than ECGD. I mentioned to Mr Stanton-Jones the considerations concerning the issue of an export licence for Iraq (he is well aware of the political problem vis-a-vis Kuwait). I went over the Defence Sales suggestions for leaving the matter open until their presentation had taken place in Kuwait and added that other conditions also supported postponement of a decision. He said that it would be a disadvantage for the licence to be granted at the moment because he intended to use it as a pretext for not complying fully with the Iraqi tender specifications and also as a shield against possible Kuwait criticism. I suggested that in

the/

the circumstances related by him it would seem to be preferable for a decision on the licence to be postponed until after the Kuwait presentation. His reaction was that the decision should be taken soon so that the company would know where it stood and also could move swiftly if the Iraqis were to respond to their offer. This would still make it possible for him to use the licence ploy with Iraq and Kuwait providing we withhold its issue until required, which would give British Hovercraft the best of both worlds, assuming of course that our decision was favourable.

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

29 January 1974

---

1 What Mr Stanton Jones wants at the moment is not a licence in his hand but a promise from us that we would grant one at a time suitable for him. This puts us in an invidious position; we do not, as I understand it, give hypothetical decisions of this nature. I have, no doubt, however that if we tell BHC this bluntly they will ask for a licence immediately and still use the ploy of denying its existence (assuming it is granted) with the Iraqis and Kuwaitis.

This refusal to go through the agony of hypothetical decisions has understandably always been FCO policy.

2 I consider that we should continue to stall with BHC. It seems to me that the "condition-meeting" tenders will take some time to evaluate, and presumably eliminate, before the Iraqis could reasonably turn to the BHC offer. We should put this point to BHC and explain that we would prefer to postpone consideration until such time as the Iraqis indicate their wishto negotiate terms. At that time, we would do our best to give them a very rapid decision.

3 If the recipients agree to follow the action proposed in para 2 above, I also consider that it would be wise for Mr Wright to explain to the DTI (Mr Glaves Smith?) the background to our decision and to reassure him that we are in no way obstructing the path of British exporters quoting, if we get it, BHC's acceptance of our position. Mr Macdonald, Defence Sales, will wish to know of BHC's views on the Kuwait sale.

G S Burton
Middle East Department

30 January 1974

1. I agree

1. I agree to the proposed stalling tactic. The difficulty could clearly resolve itself.

30/1

I agree. When Mr. Raftery has spoken to Mr. Stanton Jones again, I could have a word with Mr. Glass Smith.* But if BHC insist on a decision now (and they have for all already asked for one in their letter of 18 January) we shall have to submit.

*Mr Glass Smith has been replaced by Mr David Royce.

30/1

30/1.

Mr. Wright.

I have explained our preference for postponing consideration to Mr. Stanton Jones. He accepted this course and he stated clearly his understanding that postponement could not pre-judge the decision in any way: the matter would have to be considered on its merits in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. I added that he could be assured that there would be no delay in securing the decision once the moment came.

Mr. Evanton Jones said he was relieved that at least the request had not been turned down flatly. However, he had an additional problem: apparently Air Vice Marshall Coulthard had been in touch with his Deputy Chairman, Sir Christopher Hartley, this morning to warn him that the Iraq deal could prejudice relations with Iran. This worried Mr. Evanton Jones, who had sounded out the Iranians privately some time ago and had established that they would not object. I said that this coincided with our view but I would consult MOD Sales to find out more of the background. Thought Thought that there had been no recent complications and that it was merely that MOD Sales were a little out of step with us. I will follow this up + will reassure Mr Evanton Jones in due course.

You may now wish to contact Mr Royce.

I have explained the position to Mr. Royce, who is content 1/2

I. Dallis 30/1.

12

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RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
- 4 FEB 1974
NBR 10/1

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

R Stanton Jones Esq
Managing Director
British Hovercraft Corporation Ltd
East Cowes
Isle of Wight
PO32 6RH

Your reference

Our reference

Date 31 January 1974

As it is unlikely that I will have a chance to telephone you today, I am writing this brief letter to confirm that I have sorted out the crossed wires in Defence Sales over Iran: ? Iraq Air Vice Marshall Coulthard has undertaken to square everything with Sir C. Hartley when he calls on Sir Lester Suffield today. No IRAN

I have also informed Defence Sales about your acceptance of our preference for the postponement of a decision on the export licence pending your approach to the Basra Port Authority and your understanding that this postponement did not in any way pre-judge the outcome of the decision.

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

Mr Bo[illegible] 1/2

I have told Defence Sales that it is important for their rep. at the Kuwait demonstration to be fully briefed about the Hovercraft situation.

1/2

I.A. 4/2

CONFIDENTIAL

FO 261/E 074/07

TOP ~~ADVANCE~~ COPY

MBR10/1 (c/1974)

⑬

LKS NR 210/7

RR MODUK

RR FCO

Def. D (2)

~~MED~~

GR 90

(2x)

CYPHER CAT A

[files]

FM BAGHDAD 070800Z

Mr Raftery

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE MODUK ( FOR DEF SALES) TEL NO DIG/EDW/FOH 070800Z
OF 7 FEBRUARY INFO TO MODUK (DI 4) AND FCO DEF DEPT.

FROM SANDERS.

HS1182 HAWK.

DURING COURSE OF MEETING AT MY REQUEST WITH IRAQ MOD YESTERDAY LT COL AHMAD KHAIRI IAF SAID THEY WERE INTERESTED IN THIS AIRCRAFT. AND WOULD LIKE FURTHER DETAILS.
PLEASE FORWARD LITERATURE TO INCLUDE PERFORMANCE DATA,

FUTURE AVAILABILITY, AND COST WOULD THERE BE ANY OBJECTION TO SALE TO IRAQ? X

KHAIRI ASKED IF WE COULD SUPPLY THE INFORMATION WITHIN THE NEXT TWO WEEKS

Slightly unusual use of the Training Attaché by the Iraqis but in view of their approach in Paris, we should not stand on our dignity 11/2

BT

Mr Burton

Mr Wiltshire

Mr. Clark

Mr. Raftery pl. speak 13/2

NNNN

L

I agree with Mr Burton: we shd beg the question.

The HS1182 is still on the drawing board: it could be the successor to the GNAT and will be designed as a training aircraft, though attachments for hardware will be available. In view of the long-term nature of this inquiry, I do not think that we should give a view on X at this stage. 13/2

CONFIDENTIAL

7.

(14)

BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
15 FEB 1974
NBR 10/1

12 February 1974

G S Burton Esq
Middle East Department
FCO

Telegram I.A. 20/2 ~~Mr Rafferty~~

RSB 14/2

Dear Graham,

## HAWK AIRCRAFT TRAINER

M/R. E. 14/2

1. You will have seen (my tel 34 of 8 February) that the Iraq MOD have enquired for details of the Hawker Siddeley Aircraft Trainer with a view to purchase.

2. I am writing from Kuwait to say that we are not sure how serious this interest is, but you will no doubt be considering before providing information whether or not it is in our interests to supply "arms" to Iraq. There are a few clear points in favour of doing so. We already train a few of their best pilots on our aircraft, and Iraq has some British aircraft still (Hunters). There is (presumably) very little security objection to releasing to Iraq the technology of a Trainer aircraft - though we must accept that it is available to the Russians to examine.

3. Iraq was on the list of battlefield countries embargoed from military supplies during the Middle East war. That ban has now been lifted. We have never discussed what the imposition or lifting of the ban really meant, but we assumed in Baghdad that, even with a ban, there would be little objection to the supply of defensive radar, communications equipment, softskinned vehicles, and training aids (e.g. flight simulators). A training aircraft without weapons is hardly more offensive than any of these items, and with the ban lifted I think it may be difficult to find grounds not to supply.

NB no: the ban was total

Yours ever

I McCluney

[illegible] 18/2

Mr. Williams, Head of Defence Sales has commented that he hopes we will not supply the HS trainer.

I propose to reply to [illegible] as above i.e. not to enter into any polemics regarding what we may or may not want to sell to Iraq.

Anyway I assume that this ~~subject~~ is taboo as far as the Swedes are concerned, hence McCluney's recourse to writing from Kuwait. 18/2

CONFIDENTIAL

Dat: ~~Civil Aviation~~ !

TOP C

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REGISTRY No 35
22 FEB 1974
NBR 10/1

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(NBR 10/1)

GPS 80
PRIORITY
CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 201540Z

RESTRICTED
TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 31 OF 20 FEBRUARY 1974.

/13

YOUR TELEGRAM TO MODUK 070800Z FEBRUARY AND YOUR LETTER OF 12 FEBRUARY: HS1182 HAWK

1. WE SEE NO OBJECTION TO PROVIDING THIS LITERATURE AND THIS IS BEING ARRANGED.

2. WE WOULD NOT WISH TO MAKE ANY COMMITMENT ON SALES AT THIS STAGE AND SANDERS SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID DISCUSSING THE MATTER. HE COULD IF NECESSARY REFER TO THE LIMITED TERMS OF HIS APPOINTMENT AS TRAINING ATTACHE, AGREED BY THE IRAQIS. HE MAY SAY THAT THE AIRCRAFT IS NOT YET IN SERVICE AND THAT IT WILL BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE IT IS AVAILABLE FOR EXPORT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

| FILES | COPIES TO |
|---|---|
| MED | D 1 4 ) MOD |
| DEFENCE D | SALES 1 ) |
| SIR G ARTHUR | |
| MR WEIR | |
| MR CAMPBELL | |

RESTRICTED

U/IC

RESTRICTED

LH 384E

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 FEB 1974
~~MBR10~~/2.

~~12~~

16

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone ~~01-437-9288 ext.~~ 01-632 3484

Your reference MBR10/1

Our reference D/Sales/113/18/1

Date 22 February 1974

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

We are approaching DS13b for clearance of the equipment described below. Pending their reply, could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of this equipment please?

1 Country: Iraq

2 Description of weapons system: ZB 298

ZB 298 is a lightweight non-coherent pulsed doppler radar operating in the X-band. It is used for the detection of men and equipment on land and water, detection of helicopters and the adjustment of artillery fire. This can be done in all weather and by day or night.

3 Security classification of equipment: RESTRICTED

4 Further information: This equipment is produced by Marconi-Elliott Avionic Systems Ltd.

Yours sincerely

Christine Lamb.

C LAMB (Miss)

Copies to:
Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr G J Gammon - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)
Mr T E Nissen - D/Sales Supply

1. MWD to note.

2. Mr. Raftery MWD

May I have your comments pl.?

MK McIntosh
26.2.74

Miss McIntosh. (E MS 26)

No objection.

Letter to MOD

MKM 1/3

R 27/2 ✓

RESTRICTED

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
4 MAR 1974
~~NBP10/2~~

(17)

MISS C LAMB
SALES 4c
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
STUART HOUSE

Your reference

Our reference NBP 10/2 NBR 10/1

Date / March 1974

Dear Miss Lamb,

ZB 298 FOR IRAN – 9 – M.O.D. informed 5/3

1. Your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 of 22 February refers.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of the ZB 298 radar system to Iran. 9

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

Miriam McIntosh.

M R McIntosh (Miss)
Defence Department

RESTRICTED

I.A. 4/3

CONFIDENTIAL

Enter 7/3

(18)

BRITISH EMBASSY
KUWAIT

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
-6 MAR 1974
NBR 10/1

10/20 6 March 1974

P J Raftery Esq MBE
Middle East Department
FCO

Write MR 13/3

I.A.

Dear Peter,

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

1. Commander Kelly, Naval Adviser in KLT, tells me that a German friend of his here, who has just recently returned from Baghdad, has heard about Iraqi interest in Hovercraft. The German understood that the Iraqis wanted them in connection with the Sea Island oil terminal which they plan to build.

There is nothing startling here: the Basra Harbour authorities asked for tenders so their interest is public knowledge.

2. Although the Kuwaitis have not said anything to us and nothing has appeared in the local press, it seems likely that this story will rapidly get about. I shall be grateful therefore if you can let me know how we stand on this sale (our telegram number 76 of 19 January refers).

Yours,

Robin

R A Kealy

I.A. 21/3

Mr. Williams 7/3

Mr [illegible] 7/3

The Kuwait demonstration will be out of the way on 12 March and I will then speak to British Hovercraft.

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] (22)
I.A. 29/3

P.W. 14/3. noted 7/3.

See minute 7/3

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
11 MAR 1974
NBR 10/1

(19)

FROM: I. S. McDONALD, DIRECTOR OF SALES 1

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
Stuart House 23-25 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ.
Telex 23605 Telephone XXXXXXXXXX 01-632-3470

~~Mr Wright (MED)~~ I have met Major Mahmood as interpreter with Cyl visitors to MCE. Kind, about sixteenth rate, in some cases no judgement whatsoever. Not, I'd have thought, to be used in any circs. as an interpreter in matters of importance. JC 7/3

6 March 1974

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Craig

Yesterday a Major A. L. Mahmood telephoned me and asked very urgently if he could speak with me. He sounded rather mysterious on the telephone and at first I said that I could not manage a meeting. As you know, I am just on my way to Saudi Arabia and time is at a premium. Additionally, I do not like to meet mysterious people with mysterious commissions. Major Mahmood persisted and said that he had important questions to ask me from a Foreign Secretary. In the end I agreed to have lunch with him.

2. Major Mahmood turns out to be Iraqi born. He now assures me he has British citizenship. He also told me he works closely with the FCO in a translation capacity.

3. His purpose in meeting me was to ask what the HMG reaction would be if Iraq approached us with a request for arms. In reply I kept strictly to general points saying that of course Iraq must recognise that arms sales was a creature of politics and policies between Governments. They represented a degree of trust between the Governments concerned. Iraq at present had no diplomatic relations with HMG and even when, or if, these relations were re-established it would be realistic to look for a growth of trust rather than an immediate accretion.

4. I also said that there would of course be security considerations, particularly bearing in mind the Russian presence in Iraq.

/

Mr. A. J. M. Craig
Head of NENAD
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Room W75A
Downing Street (West)
London. SW1A 2AL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. Major Mahmood took all these points and agreed with me that if there was any possibility of arms sales to Iraq it must come gradually over a period of time as confidence and trust grew between our two countries. He did not appear surprised or disappointed at this ultra-cautious reaction but said he would report it faithfully back to the Iraqi Minister of the Interior who is now seemingly in London. He also mentioned he would be accompanying this Minister to a Health Farm in England next week.

The Minister in fact left the UK 2 days after the conversation.

6. I was concerned throughout our talk not to commit or seem to commit HMG in any way. Indeed as you know, the prospects of any sales to Iraq raise very considerable difficulties for us in our sales relations both with Kuwait and with Iran.

Yours sincerely,

M. D. Ross

PS/D Sales 1.

(Dictated by I. S. McDonald
and signed in his absence)

Reference..................................

20

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35
11 MAR 1974
MBR10/1

Mr. Clark 8/3
Mr. Williams 11/3
Mr. Burton 11/3
Mr. Raftery 11/3

E.M.A.

ARMS SALES FOR IRAQ

You will wish to see the attached letter from Mr. McDonald in MOD Sales to Mr. Craig about an approach from Major Mahmood. You will also wish to note Mr. Craig's comment on him.

2. It is curious that the Iraqi Minister of the Interior should choose to pass a message in this way. There was no reference to any possible arms sales during the call which Mr. Weir and I paid on General Ghaidan on 25 February. I have no doubt, however, that arms sales will become an issue once diplomatic relations have been resumed and it might be worth giving some preliminary consideration to the general lines we should follow in responding to such requests.

P.R.H. Wright
Middle East Department

8 March 1974

It is strange that the message should come in this way. We have had no other approaches about arms sales (hovercraft are something of a special case of our own creation) but I agree with Mr Wright the Iraqis will doubtless raise the issue as our relations improve.

11/3

/Although

CONFIDENTIAL

Flag A

Although it is true that we have had no other specific enquiries for arms from official circles in Iraq, Major Sander's curious conversation recently at the Iraqi MOD may have been in Iraqi eyes the first step in smoothing the way for future requests.

On the line we should take with the Iraqis following any resumption of diplomatic relations, I think we could do no better than follow the example of Mr MacDonald. Clearly the Iraqi attitude both to us and her neighbours together with the strong Russian presence there make it very difficult for us to consider ~~any~~ sales of any importance; I am sure even the Iraqis will appreciate this.

11/3

**From: P D Brittain, Assistant Director, Sales 1b**

Room 316

(21)

Mr Bowtell 13/3

Mr Rafferty 14/3

E.M.A. 14/3

This is alright. 12/3

Major J Y Sanders, RRF
Training Liaison Attache
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
Baghdad
c/o Foreign and Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1.

D/Sales/113/1/1

7th March, 1974

REGISTRY No 35
15 MAR 1974
MBR10 | 1

I was most interested, and pleased, to have your letter of 18 February about your role in regard to Defence Sales opportunities in Iraq.

I wholly concur in your assessment of the developments in this field. As you infer, however, much that we can offer, and do offer elsewhere, is bound to be controversial in relation to Iraq. Any proposal to supply military equipment has to go through triple hoops of fire. If at all contentious in the political sense it has to survive possibly hostile scrutiny in Parliament; if it has security aspects these have to be considered seriously so long as there is danger that the Russians might benefit, and to our detriment; and not the least consideration, both Iran and Kuwait with both of whom we have very close diplomatic relations are most important customers for British defence equipment. We are obliged therefore to keep our profile low. This does not mean that we cannot respond to Iraqi interest: we must just be careful in how we develop our relationship with them. It can do more harm than good, all ~~the~~ round, to encourage expectations that have to be denied. It will be, I think, very much a matter for your judgement as to how far you go along the road with them. Obviously Jaguar is out. But we are not objecting to the Iraqis having information on the HS.1182 Hawk Trainer always provided there is no commitment to supply.

In one area, however, we can be more forthcoming. ICL have recently entertained Brigadier Al-Azzawi and his team in UK in the hope of selling computers for logistics management. We have lent considerable support to this in affording facilities for visiting MOD establishments where ICL equipment is in use and providing presentations of the use to which it is put. We made a similar arrangement when Dr Bayati, Director General of the National Computer Centre, Baghdad, came here in December. Both visits seem to have gone very well indeed. And this brings me to a point that falls immediately within your current terms of reference. Brigadier Al-Azzawi was particularly keen to have the offer of places on UK, ideally MOD, courses for ADP training. He was given no commitment but an undertaking that it would be considered. This is now being done, and we will ask you in due course to let the Brigadier know the outcome.

/Your request

**Your request for literature, etc, is being taken up and I hope the supply will start again before long.**

**I hope that we may meet at the next DA's conference.**

**A copy of this letter goes to Peter Williams of the Middle East Department.**

**Yours**

P. D. Brittain

**(P D BRITTAIN)**

22

CONFIDENTIAL

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED
REGISTRY No. 8
21 MAR 1974
NBR 10/1

~~off~~.

R A Kealy Esq
British Embassy
KUWAIT

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 14 March 1974

BU in one month. noted R.

R 21/3

Dear Robin,

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ

1 Your letter 10/20 of 6 March refers.

2 The short answer is that officially the position has not changed. After discussions with British Hovercraft it became clear that there was no real urgency for a decision on the Iraq sale and in some ways it suited their book, particularly in connection with the Kuwait negotiations, if we were to leave things in the air for the time being. We understand that they submitted a tender to the Iraqi Ports Administration by the deadline (6 March) since when they have heard nothing. They do not propose to display any further interest for the time being and particularly while the Kuwait prospects are looking so bright (they have intimated that if this deal is clinched they may let the Iraqi sale drop quietly).

3 So far as I know, the Iraqis have not been particularly secretive about this matter and I believe that their notices to tender went out in the normal way. We need not therefore be surprised if the topic is mentioned in business circles but for our own reasons we would not of course wish to encourage discussion about it.

Yours,

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

CONFIDENTIAL

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

23

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

*Defence Sales Organisation*

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
19 MAR 1974
NBR10 | 1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 27
18 MAR 1974

Mr Lane

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 18 March, 1974.

Dear Miss McIntosh

We have received an enquiry from the Embassy of IRAQ on behalf of Iraqi Army for several spare parts for .303" Bren Machine Guns, Mk I & II. Some of these are available from stock.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the supply of these spare parts, valued at £855 approx.

Yours sincerely,

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

① MED to enter

② Mr Rafferty MED
Any objections pse?
Colin C Lane 19/3

Mr Lane.
No MED objections.
R 21/3

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
26 MAR 1974
NBR10/1

24

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Your reference
Our reference NBR 10/1 1A. 26/3
Date 21 March 1974

Dear Ogun,

SPARE PARTS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 18 March to Miss McIntosh about the supply of spare parts for .303 Bren Guns to Iraq.

2. There are no political objections to the supply of these spare parts.

I am sending a copy of this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely

Colin G. Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

25

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**

*Defence Sales Organisation*

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
26 MAR 1974
NBR10|1

RE
REGIS
15 MAR 1974

Your reference

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 11 March, 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request from the Government of IRAQ for supply to the Iraqi Army of Qty.5 25 Pdr. Gun Barrels, valued at £3,750.

Will you please say if there is any objection to this sale.

Miss ~~McIntosh~~. DF/MOD
No objection. 21/3
21/3

Yours sincerely

Copy to:
Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

I agree.

Mr [illegible]
Mr Rafferty

Mr. Rafferty
MED.
May I have your comments pl?
M R McIntosh.
14.3.74.

No objection, I think the Iraqis already have ~~the weapon~~ the weapon. 25/3

26

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
26 MAR 1974
MBR10/1

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House
Southwark Street
SE1

Your reference

Our reference

Date 21 March 1974

IA R 26/3

Dear Ogun,

GUN BARRELS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 March to Miss McIntosh about the supply of Qty 5 25 Pdr Gun Barrels to the Iraqi Army.

2. There are no political objections to their sale.

3. I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely

Colin G. Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

cc to: Head of DS13
MOD DS13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Material Dept

27

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
29 MAR 1974
NBR10/1

**British Attaché,**
**Royal Swedish Embassy, Baghdad,**
**British Interests Section.**

Copy to Mr MED
→ Mr Rafferty. 28/3.

Directorate of Sales (1),
Ministry of Defence (PE),
Stuart House,
23/25 Soho Square,
London W1U5FJ.

1A. 29/3

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No.27
26 MAR 1974

10/7
16th March 1974

25/3

Very:

~~Mr Williams~~

Mr Bullkin 28/3

I think we can take this slowly.

29/3

**HS1182 Hawk Trainer Aircraft**

Reference:

A. My signal EDW/FOH 070800Z Feb

B. FCO signal No. 31 201540Z Feb

1. At a meeting at Iraq MOD yesterday with the Director of Air Training for the Iraqi Air Force Group Captain Khalid Sarah this subject was raised again.

2. Gp. Captain Khalie Sarah stated:

   a. They are very interested in this aircraft.

   b. They would want a minimum order of 30 aircraft.

   c. Air Colonel (Gp. Capt.) Kahtan Azzawi called into Hawker Siddley in London the other day and collected more detail on the aircraft.

   d. They realised there was no hope of delivery before 1977/78.

3. I followed the instructions outlined in Ref.B Nevertheless they still want to know.

   a. Likely price
   b. Earliest delivery date

4. Gp. Captain Khalid Sarah is arriving in UK around the 20 March. He is attending a PSO Course at RAF Biggin Hill from 25 March - 5 April and could well be pursuing this matter with Hawker Siddley.

J Y Sanders

Sanders J.Y.
Major
Training Liason Attache

Copy to:

FCO Defence Dept.
King Charles Street,
London SW1.

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

Outer MOD

(28)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27
2 APR 1974

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 2nd April, 1974.

RECEIVED REGISTRY No 33
8 APR 1974
NBR 10/1

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received an enquiry from the Government of IRAQ for the supply of various 5.5 and 25 Pdr. gun spares to the Iraqi Army. These spares will be provided from Army stock.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the sale of the spares, valued at £8,500, to Iraq.

Wait another ten weeks

Yours sincerely,

Mr Rafferty

8/5

I also think it should be delayed.

M 10/4

Copy to:
Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

PB 8/4

~~RW.~~ in memoria

8/4

Mr. Williams 8/4 → Mr Rafferty (220) refers

Any objections pse?

Colin [illegible] 3/4

This is only a minor sale but I suggest that we should delay now that the M.E. arms sales policy is in the offing. 8/4

U/VJ

LH 384D

~~Wait another two weeks~~ noted 15 Enter MED

29

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London ~~W1V~~ 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone ~~01-437 9288 ext~~
Direct Line: 01-632-3484
Switchboard: 01-632-3333

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27 5 APR 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35 8 APR 1974

NBR10/1

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Your reference ~~BW in the minute~~ noted 15.

Our reference D/Sales/113/18/1

Date 3rd. April 1974

wait another two weeks.

~~Wait another two weeks~~ 15.

Dear Miss McIntosh

Could we please have an indication of your Departments view to the release of the equipment described below:-

MOD informed the ~~Lane~~. BW 24.4.74

1 Country - Iraq

2 Description of Weapons System - 101" Land Rovers and one ton trailers.

I hear this must await an ME Arms Sales policy decision

3 Security classification of Equipment - Unclassified.

4 Further Information - The Land Rovers are produced by BLMC. The quantity required is 800-1000.

I am copying this letter to members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

Mr Raftery.

Christine Lamb.

C LAMB (MISS)

BLMC have been discussing these items with Iraqi officials for some months now. I believe an Iraqi General is in the UK at the moment & has been given a demonstration at Larkhill.

Any objections? Colin G Lane 5/4

Copies to:
Mr H R Braden DS 13
Mr M Esau DS 13
Mr G J Gammon Treasury
Mr P T Durnell DTI(EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier DPS(C Team)

~~Defence CE Miss McIntosh~~

No MED objection

30/5/74

CONFIDENTIAL

From: P D Brittain, Assistant Director, Sales 1b

(30)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
23 APR 1974
MBR10/1

Mr [illegible] – to see
TSB 18/4

Direct Line 01 632 4707
Switchboard 01 632 3333

Major [illegible] Y Sanders
Training Liaison Officer
British Interests Section
Royal Swedish Embassy
BAGHDAD
c/o Foreign & Commonwealth Office King Charles Street
SW1

D/Sales/113/73/1

10 April 1974

Dear

You wrote on 16 March (your 10/7) about Iraqi interest in the Hawk Trainer Aircraft.

Colonel Sarab and Colonel Lufta are here. I have not seen them but I am told that they enquired, as you said they would, about availability of Hawk and, as it happens, Jaguar. They are being told that commitments to the RAF and to existing customers place any expectations for new orders so far into the future that there is little practical basis for discussion at the present time. Of course, the situation may change. If I see this happening I will give you early warning.

I have not met these officers, but I had a pleasant encounter with General Agha a few weeks ago when he was entertained by the London Chamber of Commerce. He was here on business connected with the civil engineering aspects of the new Barracks complex at Kirkuk.

General Jenab is here, of course, in connexion with a possible order for the commercial type Land Rover. We can only wait and see what happens on that one. The order could be substantial: BLMC are well aware of that. But there may be one or two hoops to go through before an order is landed.

A copy of this letter goes to Peter Williams MED.

Yours sincerely

PBrittain

Discussed with Mr. Brittain: he will let us know if the Landrover negotiations should harden. At the moment they are fairly tentative.

N.B. I have since cleared an E.L.A.W Ex/A.
the export of 800-1000 Landrovers to Iraq.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

MOD DISTRIBUTION

31

FM [illegible]GHDAD 180500Z

CONFIDENTIAL

MED.

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EDW 180500Z OF 18 APRIL.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
24 APR 1974
MBR10|1

Mr [illegible] 18/4

FOR DEFENCE SALES 1B FROM SANDERS
ICL COMPUTERS TO IRAQ.
YOUR D/SALES /113/1/1 OF 21 MARCH REFERS.

ONE. AT MEETING WITH DUNCANSON OF ICL TODAY FOLLOWING POINTS WERE RAISED.

E 1A

TWO. ICL CONTRACT ABOUT TO BE SIGNED AND THEIR TRG PROGRAMME NOW ARRANGED.

25/4

THREE. DUNCANSON RECOMMENDS FOLLOWING COURSE OF ACTION FOR OUR ASSISTANCE
ALPHA. SHORT TERM. TWO SYSTEMS COURSES APPLICATION ORIENTED OF APPROX 4 WEEKS DURATION STARTING AT BEGINNING OF AUGUST. IAF TO STUDY RAF LOGISTIC SYSTEM AND IRAQ ARMY TO STUDY ARMY PERSONNEL AND PAY ROLE STATISTICS.
BRAVE. LONG TERM A SERIES OF BACKGROUND AND PRACTICAL COURSES DESIGNED TO TRAIN A NUCLEUS OF IRAQI PERSONNEL OVER A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS.

GOUR. I WILL BE IN LONDON 22-26 APRIL SUGGEST I COLLECT FROM YOU LIST OF AVAILABLE COURSES AND SYLLABI AND RETURN WITH IT TO DISCUSS WITH DUNCANSON AND REPS FROM IAF AND IRAQ ARMY BEST COURSE OF ACTION FOLLOWED BY FIRM BIDS FOR COURSES.

FIVE. IT WAS SUGGESTED BY DUNCANSON THAT YOU SHOULD BE ASKED AGAIN POSSIBILITY OF RAF OR ARMY EMFICER BEING SECONDED TO IRAQ TO ASSIST IN SETTING UP SERVICES COMPUTER SYSTEMS.

MCCLUNEY

BT

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

32

REC'D IN
REGISTRY No 35
25 APR 1974

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
22 APR 1974

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Your reference MBR 10/1

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 19 April, 1974.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received an enquiry from the Military Attache, Iraqi Embassy, Brussels, for the supply of Qty.40 Demolition Test Sets Mk.1. The items, valued at £1,112, are available from British Army stocks.

Will you please say if there is any objection to this sale.

Yours sincerely,

Copy to:
Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

1. MED to enter

Letter to MOD)

2. Mr. Raftery

MRM 29/4

May I have your comments pl.?

No MED objection 25/4

23. 4. 74.

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

30 APR 1974
NBR10/1

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
ROOM 1144
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Your reference
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 29 April 1974

Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales 523/10/12 of 19 April.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of 40 Demolition Test sets Mk1 to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

Miriam McIntosh

M R McIntosh (Miss)
Defence Department

PA. 30/4

34

GR 110

CONFIDENTIAL

Telegram and
E+PA

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
30 APR 1974
MBR10/1

TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 290800Z APR

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 211 OF 289 APRIL RPTD FOR INFO
TO MODUK (FOR HDS).

HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

1. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO CONSIDERABLE STRAIN SINCE THE SHAH TOLD MY PREDECESSOR HE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THIS DEAL. WE HAVE SEEN NOTHING FURTHER ON THE SUBJECT SINCE KUWAIT TEL NO 76, BUT, IF IT IS NOT TOO LATE, YOU MAY LIKE TO LOOK AGAIN AT THE SALE IN THE LIGHT OF MY TEL NO 204. ← (see above [illegible]) I RECOMMEND, IF YOU STILL WANT TO GO AHEAD, THAT WE OBTAIN THE SHAH'S CONFIRMATION THAT HE STILL HAS NO OBJECTION.

2. IF A LICENCE HAS ALREADY BEEN GRANTED AND CANNOT BE REVOKED, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR US HERE THAT THE DEAL SHOULD RECEIVE NO REPEAT NO PUBLICITY.

PARSONS

FILES
DEFENCE DEPT
MED
WED
PUSD
IRD
GIPD
NEWS DEPT
PS/MR ENNALS
PS/MR HATTERSLEY
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON
MOD (INT)

CONFIDENTIAL

35

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 35
1 MAY 1974
(NBR 10/1)

IA. 2/5

GR 45

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 301450Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELNO.147 OF 30 APRIL/74. INFO KUWAIT.

YOUR TELNO.211 (NOT TO KUWAIT) : HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

2. NO LICENCE HAS BEEN ISSUED NOR WAS ANY DECISION TAKEN ON THE PROPOSED SALE. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BRITISH HOVERCRAFT THAT THE IRAQ PORTS AUTHORITY HAVE LOST INTEREST AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING BOATS INSTEAD.

3. WE SHALL OF COURSE CONSULT YOU SHOULD THE IRAQIS RENEW THEIR INTEREST.

CALLAGHAN

F I L E S
MED
MR WEIR

COPIES TO
HDS MOD

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Discussion with Kamal Adham 16 April 1974.

Egypt

He told me that he had recently seen President Sadat who had expressed some anxiety about the slow pace of the negotiations with British firms for the support of Egypt's defence industry. He stated that all the necessary decisions had been taken between Egypt and Saudi Arabia regarding the manufacture of the Hawk (HS1182) in Egypt. He said that the proposal would be worth about £120M and that it was expected that some 200 aircraft would be ordered initially for Arab countries.

I asked him about the position of Ashraf Marawan and he indicated that he still had President Sadat's confidence.

He expressed pleasure at the forthcoming Lynx demonstration in Egypt which he expected the RSAF would attend. He said there were doubts in Egypt whether Helwan could cope with the "production" of Lynx as well as the Hawk and he believed it might well be necessary for new facilities to be constructed for the Lynx production line.

He asked me to speak to Westlands because it was being alleged in Egypt that contrary to Egyptian wishes Westlands were emplying agents, namely Mr Dennis Walters MP and El Gindi. I gathered that El Gindi's wife had approached the President's wife and this had made Sadat very angry (Note: I subsequently spoke to Mr Speechley of Westlands who denied that they were employing agents for their Egyptian business. Evidently they had had an "arrangement" with El Gindi some years ago and he was now trying to get a commission on the helicopter deal that had been financed by the Saudis - but all that Westlands had offered was a small ex-gratia payment (which El Gindi had refused as being insufficient) which would not be charged against the contract).

Abu Dhabi

Kamal said that he thought the Rapier deal would be concluded successfully and he offered to help in that area. He thought that Abu Dhabi might well be in the market for aircraft shortly since she intended to transfer her Mirages to Egypt. The French were being very active and were offering the F1.

how? [illegible]

Kuwait

He thought the chances of our selling Chieftain and Rapier were good although the US and the French were putting on aggressive sales campaigns.

Iraq

His view was that the present Iraqi Government was faced with serious problems. They were finding that the Kurds were, in some areas, better equipped than the Government forces. It was likely therefore that the country would be in disarray for some time.

36

REC'D IN
REGISTRY No 35
13 MAY 1974
NR R10/1

FO 043/E 057/13

LKS NR 825/13

PP MODUK ARMY

GRS 50

CYPHER CAT A

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

Eng H.A.

13/5

FM BAGHDAD 130555Z MAY 1974.

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 13 MAY 1974.

DIG EDW.
FOR DEF SALES 1B.
FROM SANDERS.

HAWK HS 1182 TRAINER.

FAILED TO COLLECT APPROX COST AND EARLIEST DELVERY DATES FROM HS OR YOURSELVES. CAN YOU SUPPLY INFO FOR ME TO PASS ON AT NEXT MEETING WITH IAF WITHOUT COMMITTMENTGM

DONOVAN
BT

NNNN

MBR10/1

# PROCHE-ORIENT

*Pour un montant total de 750 millions de francs*

## La France prévoit de livrer à plusieurs pays missiles, des mortiers et des équipements laser ou infrarouges

France a accepté de vendre l'équivalent de 750 millions de au total des matériels ter- aux forces armées d'une douzaine de pays du Proche- . Ces ventes tous azimuts ont de particulier qu'elles concer- pour l'essentiel, des missiles ues sol-sol et des équipements de précision du tir (laser ou uge) adaptés à des blindés des hélicoptères de combat. emier rang des fournisseurs, t notamment la Société natio- dustrielle aérospatiale (SNIAS), ociété française de matériels ment (SOFMA) et la société Thomson-Brandt, qui ont négo- s contrats avec le Koweït, les s d'Abu-Dhabi et de Qatar le golfe Persique), la Libye, an. l'Irak et l'Arabie Saoudite. tous ces accords, il a été que serait appliquée la clause e non-réexportation, c'est-à-dire un des clients étrangers ne revendre à un tiers les maté- cquis, sans l'autorisation de la

t ainsi que des missiles S.S.-11 rpon, à courte portée, seront au Koweït (40 millions de , à Abu-Dhabi (77 millions), abie Saoudite (90 millions) et k (90 millions) : pour plus de mille au total. Ces engins équipés, le premier, d'une nde de tir manuelle et, le , d'une télécommande infra- . Ces missiles sol-sol sont s à détruire ou à endommager jectifs fixes ou mobiles, terrestres ou marins, protégés ou non, à des distances inférieures à 3 kilomètres, selon des calculs de leur constructeur, la SNIAS. Dans le cas du Koweït, comme dans celui de l'Arabie Saoudite et de l'Irak, ces engins S.S.-11 ou Harpon seraient installés à bord d'automitrailleuses légères ou de véhicules tous terrains Panhard. En revanche, la principauté d'Abu-Dhabi envisage de monter ces engins sur des hélicoptères Alouette III ou sur des jeeps Land Rover.

La France fournira aussi à Abu-Dhabi deux millions de cartouches calibre 7,62 Nato, des amorces pour des projectiles de 155 millimètres, des pièces détachées pour canon de 20 millimètres et des installations spéciales pour le tir de missiles air-sol AS-37 anti-radar à partir des avions supersoniques d'appui tactique Mirage-5 déjà achetés au groupe Dassault-Breguet.

La Libye s'est portée acquéreur, pour un montant global de 95 millions de francs, de soixante-dix mortiers de 120 millimètres et d'environ soixante mille projectiles explosifs, fumigènes ou éclairants. Ces mortiers sont montés sur roues et ils peuvent tirer à raison de dix coups à la minute, à des distances de 8 à 15 kilomètres. Selon son constructeur, la société privée Thomson-Brandt, les performances de ce mortier sont égales à celles d'un canon d'artillerie, mais il est plus léger et mobile. Tout indique, selon des spécialistes, que les Libyens pourraient se servir de ces mortiers — largables par avion — pour l'appui direct à des forces parachutées en terrain accidenté.

Ce sont des mortiers très différents, de 60 millimètres, que l'Irak recevra de la France pour un coût total de 137 millions de francs. La transaction porte sur un millier de ces mortiers à percussion commandée ou automatique et plus de cinq cent cinquante mille projectiles explosifs, fumigènes ou éclairants. Ces armements sont destinés, selon toute probabilité, à un appui rapide d'unités d'infanterie ou de commandos engagés dans des combats de rue ou des combats courts et violents à des distances très rapprochées. De surcroît, l'Irak achètera environ soixante mille cartouches à haut pouvoir explosif et, pour 52 millions de francs, près de cinquante mille cartouches de 90 millimètres à obus charge creuse, explosifs ou fumigènes, destinées à ses automitrailleuses légères Panhard.

anti Kurdish use?

### Un artifice administratif

L'Irak prévoit aussi d'installer sur une quarantaine d'hélicoptères Alouette-III, achetés à cette occasion, des canons de 20 millimètres accompagnés de quatre cent mille munitions (soit 18 millions de francs). L'équipement de ces hélicoptères en fait, quoi que puisse en dire le gouvernement français, de redoutables plates-formes de tir et de mitraillage dans des missions offensives, mais il est vrai que, pour justifier cette transaction, le fournisseur peut faire valoir — par un artifice de procédure administrative — que l'Irak ne figure pas dans la liste des pays du Proche-Orient soumis à un embargo... Enfin, les autorités irakiennes ont demandé au représentant de la Société française de matériels d'armement (SOFMA), en mission récente à Bagdad, que leur soient livrés, pour un montant de 31 millions de francs, cent cinquante équipements laser montés sur des automitrailleuses légères Panhard et capables de repérer un objectif à 10 kilomètres.

Gunships against Kurdish use!

Des télémètres identiques seront vendus au Liban, qui a choisi, en outre, des armes collectives légères antichars de conception française pour équiper ses unités d'infanterie et de commandos. Ces armes ALO-APX-80 à charge creuse sont parachutables. Elles peuvent être portées par un seul combattant ou montées sur des véhicules terrestres, et elles atteignent des cibles distantes de 600 à 1 000 mètres. Enfin, le Liban va acquérir plus de cent trente-trois mille amorçages de projectiles pour mortiers de 81 et 120 millimètres, et des discussions continuent pour la vente de mines antichars à haut pouvoir de destruction : ces engins, dont le déclenchement est assuré par un allumeur

Randpa.
French Arms supplies to Iraq.
3/5

P.T.O.

pas à la [illegible] des émirats arabes du golfe Persique, s'apprête à conclure avec la France et le Brésil un accord tripartite au terme duquel elle recevra des véhicules blindés Cascavel, de conception brésilienne, sur lesquels seront montées des tourelles françaises avec un canon de 90 millimètres. Pour un montant de 95 millions de francs, dont un peu moins du tiers en acompte dès la signature de la commande, la France livrera les tourelles, des équipements complets infrarouges pour le tir de nuit et des jumelles infrarouges qui permettent d'observer et de conduire la nuit.

Au reste, des équipements identiques — en particulier, des épiscopes passifs, des jumelles infrarouges et des détecteurs d'alerte de sources infrarouges et impulsions laser pour la conduite de nuit, sans phares, des chars de combat sont proposés actuellement tant au Qatar qu'à plusieurs autres pays du Proche-Orient (Abou-Dhabi, Arabie Saoudite, Bahrein, Koweït et Libye) par la société française Télécommunications radioélectriques et téléphoniques (T.R.T.).

Négociées alors que Georges Pompidou était président de la République, toutes ces ventes ou ces prospections, semble-t-il, n'ont pas été interrompues à ce jour. On assiste au Proche-Orient et dans le golfe Persique à une surenchère des fournisseurs d'armements modernes : l'Union soviétique, la Grande-Bretagne, les Etats-Unis et la France n'ont, apparemment, aucune peine à trouver des clients prêts, pour la plupart, à payer comptant. Dans le cas présent, il s'avère qu'en commandant des missiles, des mortiers et des équipements laser et infrarouges, ces pays ont tiré des enseignements de la [illegible] israélo-arabe qui a mis

U/IC

Enter K16/5

(37)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27
16 MAY 1974

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
17 MAY 1974

MBR10/1

LH 384E

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation* Defence Sales 1b
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone ~~[illegible]~~ 01-632-3484

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
LONDON SW1

Your reference

Our reference
D/Sales/113/18/1

Date
13th May 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below please?

1 Country: Iraq

2 Artillery Ancillary Equipment:

| | | Qty |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Prismatic Compass Mk 3 | 750 |
| 2 | Protractor Artillery Board | 1,000 |
| 3 | Slide Rule 10" Artillery | 250 |
| 4 | Calculator Displacement FBA | 100 |
| 5 | Light Beacon Director Mk 1 | 400 |
| 6 | Aiming Point Illuminating Device | 300 |
| 7 | Proportional Divider | 100 |
| 8 | Circular Protractor 6" | 100 |
| 9 | Calculating M/C (machine). | 25 |
| 10 | Military Protractor Mk III | 1,000 |
| 11 | Lighting System for Boards No 1Mk 1 | 250 |
| 12 | Field Clinometre | 40 |
| 13 | Charge Temperature Thermometer | 200 |
| 14 | Air Photos Interpretation Device | 20 |
| 15 | Projector-Overhead | 35 |
| 16 | Range Finder 1 metre base | 50 |
| 17 | Meteorological Balloons | Not known |

3 Security classification of equipment: Unclassified

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

C. Lamb.

C LAMB

Copies to:- Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col G W A Napier - DPS (C team)

1. MKD) to enter
2/ Mr. Raftery
Any objection?
It looks like a pretty basic list of equipment for artillery ranging purposes.
MRM McIntosh.
16. 5. 74.

No objection. R 17/5

Letter to MOD MRM 21/5/74.

(38)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
20 MAY 1974
NBR 10/1

CYPHE

PRIORITY

1143

~~LKS NR 869/18~~

PP MODUK ARMY

~~GRS 50~~

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 181010Z MAY.

MOD DISTRIBUTION
MED

Entd 20/5

RESTRICTED

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 18 MAY 1974.

DIG EDW.
TO A ARM 226.
FWFROM DA.

CARTRIDGES FOR HUNTER 5G A/C.
TWO IRAQI OFFICERS VISITING U.K. DUE TO LEAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS WISH TO KNOW WHERE THEY CAN PURCHASE EIGHTY 12K/1411 CARTRIDGE EJECTOR RELEASE NO 1 MK3 FOR HUNTER A/C. ANSWER ASP.

DONOVAN
BT

NNNN

Confidential

Reference NBR 10/1

Mr Burton.

Iraq. Hovercraft.

You should see -/1- the Shah is not an obstacle to supply but Kuwait views still need to be carefully considered.

2 We now need the assessment, long overdue, from MOD Sales. The Shah has a good point in the last line of para 2.

3. You will see from Donovan's

letter that there is an additional though tentative interest in military hovercraft.

9/1/74

MOD DISTRIBUTION

C DWF E 080/16 (708)

LKS NR 857/16

PP MODUK ARMY

GR 90

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NBR 10/1

Mr. Byatton 17/5

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 160830Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EOW OF 16 MAY.
FOR DEF SALES 1B FROM DA.
ICL COMPUTER CONTRACT.
CONTRACT IN LAST STAGES OF FINALISATION.
MEETING WITH IRAQ MOD AND DG OF NCC ON SUNDAY 19 MAY TO DISCUSS
SERVICE SUPPORT WILL HELP ICL FINALISE CONTRACT.
MINUTES OF OUR MEETING NOT ARRIVED HERE, PLEASE SEND BY TELEGRAM
PRECIS OF MINUTES TO INCLUDE MAIN POINTS AND DECISIONS TO
ENABLE ME TO TALK SENSE AT IRAQI MOD MEETING.

DONOVAN

BT

1026

NNNN

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
22 MAY 1974
NBR10/1

Miss C Lamb
Sales 1b
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 21 May 1974

Dear Miss Lamb,

IRAQ: ARTILLERY ANCILLIARY EQUIPMENT

Thank you for your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 of 13 May.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of the equipment listed in your letter to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely,

Miriam McIntosh.

MISS M R McINTOSH
Defence Department

I.A. 22/5

42

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
29 MAY 1974
MBR 10/1

NO DISTRIBUTION
DTI ~~VIC~~ ST FRD
~~DTI ADELPHI~~ TRED
~~ECGD~~
GEOG DEPT ~~MED~~ R 129
~~MTD~~

Mr. Rafferty
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] 28/5
E+HA

20/5

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 200600Z

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE.

TO ROUTINE CREDA TEL NO CREDA 59 OF 20 MAY.

WESTLAND HELICOPTERS.

1. TWO IRAQI AIR FORCE OFFICERS, MAJORS AHMED NAZAR ABDUL RAHMAN AND ABIDOWN HAMEED ARE VISITING UK FROM 20 MAY TO SEE WESTLAND HELICOPTERS OF YEOVIL, ROLLS ROYCE OF BRISTOL AND MANY OTHER COMPANIES CONCERNED WITH SUPPLY OF SPARES FOR WESSEX HELICOPTERS AND HUNTER AIRCRAFT. MAJOR SANDERS HERE HAS SENT LIST OF COMPANIES TO BE VISITED TO P.D. BRITTAIN OF DEFENCE SALES 1B, IN HIS LETTER OF 10/7 OF 18 MAY.

2. THE TWO IAF MAJORS HAVE TOLD US TALE OF WOE ABOUT POOR SERVICE FOR THE 12 WESSEX HELICOPTERS IAF PURCHASED IN 1963/64. GRATEFUL FOR ANY HELP YOU , IN LIASON WITH BRITTAIN OF DEFENCE SALES, COULD GOVE THEM. THEY COULD BE CONTACTED AT IRAQI EMBASSY.

3. INTERNATIONAL COMPUTERS NEGOTIATIONS WITH IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE ( SEE LETTER FROM CHANDOR OF ICL TNTHAIN OF 8/2/74) ARE AT DELICATE STAGE, NEAR FINALISATION, BUT WITH FRENCH COMPETITOR C11 HERE AND STILL IN THE RUNNING.
CONTRACT IS EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED MID JUNE.
HELP GIVEN TO IAF ON HELICOPTER SPARES AND SERVICE MIGHT IMPROVE ICL'S CHANCES.

MCCLUNEY

43

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30 MAY 1974
(NBR 10/1)

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GPS 39
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT-A-

CONFIDENTIAL

FM FCO 291405Z

I.A. 30/5

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO IMMEDIATE KUWAIT TELNO 173 OF 29/5/INFO TEHERAN.

MODUK PE TELEGRAM 221630Z MAY REFERS: HOVERCRAFT FOR IRAQ.

1. THE WIRES HAVE GOT CROSSED AT THIS END. THE POSITION IS AS STATED IN OUR TELEGRAM TO TEHERAN NO. 147 AND JONES SHOULD NOT REPEAT NOT VOLUNTEER ANY INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT TO THE KUWAITIS. IF ASKED HE SHOULD PROFESS IGNORANCE AND REFER BACK HERE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES:
MED
MR. WEIR

COPIES TO:
DEFENCE SALES 1, MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

U/eg

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: P D BRITTAIN, AD Sales 1B

(44)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
- 4 JUN 1974
NB R10/1

4707

Major J Y Sanders
British Embassy
Baghdad
c/o Outward Bag Room
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
LONDON SW1

D/Sales/113/48/3
30 May 1974

Mr. Lofty to see
NB 3/6

Encl
HA K 3/6

MARCONI IN IRAQ

-H/R.

Thank you for your letter 10/7 of 15 May.

As you surmise, an Iraqi request to Marconi to supply ZB 298 and Tank Gun Stabilisation Kits could pose problems. We remain sensitive to the possible repercussions of supplying to Iraq anything resembling offensive equipment at the present time. I hope therefore that if pressed by Marconi you will be able to steer them away from ambitions such as these.

Equally I hope that Marconi are not getting into deep water over the prospect of installing the HF Communications equipment that you refer to. They have mentioned nothing of this to me. Beyond this I cannot comment on what is clearly at this stage a hypothetical situation. But if you get the opportunity to speak to them again on this matter it might be as well to suggest that time and effort might be saved by consultation in London before they go too far in committing themselves to what might prove an embarrassing enterprise.

P. D. Brittain

CONFIDENTIAL

Hidden Copy to P. Williams FCO

RESTRICTED

From: Major J.Y. Sanders

DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHÉS
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

15 May 1974

Ref: 10/7

P.D. Brittain Esq.,
Defence Sales 1B,
Ministry of Defence,
Stuart House,
23 Soho Square,
London W1V5FJ

Dear Mr Brittain

MARCONI IN IRAQ

I had a visit today from Mr Graham J. Linnell in Beirut with Marconi Middle East.

The United Arab Command purchased some £1m of HF Communication equipment from Marconi in 1967. Iraqs share of this has been rotting in store here since then and they have just signed a contract to inspect it with a view to installing it at a later date. The total cost to Iraq being some £42,700. In the course of our meeting I learned that Iraq is very keen to purchase:

a. ZB298
b. Tank Gun stabilisation kits

In the case of the ZB298 Mr Linnell tells me Defence Sales have already turned down the possibility of this. This seems surprising in view of the fact that they are a relatively "old" piece of kit and secondly they could not be classified as hardware. Is there any possibility of this decision being reconsidered. In the case of the Tank gun stabilisation kits I would not hazard a guess on present re-action to this but it would be interesting to know.

Marconi seem very keen to break into the Iraqi market as they are realising the potential.

I had a good trip back here. It was good to meet you and to discuss the various outstanding points. I hope I shall have the pleasure of entertaining you out here before the end of my tour.

I am looking forward to seeing the minutes of our Computer meeting.

RECEIVED IN SALES
20 MAY 1974

Yours sincerely
John Sanders

45

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
-5 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

Miss C Lamb
Ministry of Defence
Defence Sales
Stuart House
23 Soho Square
W1V 5FJ

Your reference
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 4 June 1974

Dear Miss Lamb,

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/113/18/1 dated 3 April about the supply of 101" Land Rovers and one for trailers to Iraq.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of these vehicles and trailers.

3. I am copying this letter to members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely
Colin G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

PA. 5/6

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

(46)

Enter MED

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

REGISTRY No 35
10 JUN 1974
MBR 10/1

Mr Rafferty
Any objections pse?
Colin Shanni 7/6

To MED
No objection
11/6

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 6 June, 1974.

---

Dear Miss McIntosh.

We have been asked by the Military Attache, Iraqi Embassy, Brussels, to quote for the supply of Qty.80 Cartridge Ejector Release Units No.1 Mk.3.

There are no Service stocks available for sale; supply would therefore be from new production. The estimated value of the CERU is about £560.

Will you please say if there is any objection to this order being fulfilled.

Yours sincerely,

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

LETTER FROM THE DTI
DATED 9 JANUARY 1974
REFERENCE AW/59/085

Reference

— We received this over the telephone on 14 Jan

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
10 JUN 1974
1A
MBR10/1

15/1

6/6

TO: P D BRITTAIN ESQ, AD SALES 1B

CONVERSION OF CIVIL HOVERCRAFT

You have asked for advice on the resources involved in conversion of civil hovercraft of SRN 6 and CC7 type to military use from the points of view of:

(a) ease of conversion
(b) time required to convert
(c) resources necessary.

Obviously the answers depend on the modification state at the beginning and end of the process.

No fully armed hovercraft has yet been built. LMGs are fitted to some craft. The two existing military CC7s of the British Army for example are modified relatively little from the three civil craft so far built; the craft are small and light and are used as personnel carriers or reconnaissance vehicles. The main changes are the fitting of Army communications equipment and the reduction of seating on account of the greater consequent unladen weight. A more recent and hence more powerful engine was fitted but this would now constitute the normal civil standard. No armament is fitted. If it were it would reduce the seating still further. Overall, one could say that a civil CC7 would be no more and no less easily converted than would a fast pleasure boat.

Two or three weeks work by radio fitters would cover most of the effort needed. The standard civilian CC7 is an eight seat craft. All production craft have transport joints in the hull, which enables an additional 64 inch length section to be fitted; this stretched version increases the seating to fourteen, with little ~~degr~~ degradation of performance. (To date, no stretched version has been built).

The SRN 6 has several military conversions, one of which (the vehicle-carrying SRN 6 Mark 5) requires major structural modifications for which the expertise probably only exists at Cowes. Other military conversions have a widened front door (which could be specified by a civil purchaser) a strenghened roof forward with gulling or observation dome, and a "soft top" through which cargo could be lowered. None of these modifications could be completed quickly; even at the factory, probably three to four months by a team of skilled metal workers would be needed. The result would again be a logistic or reconnaissance ~~x~~ craft rather than a fighting vehicle.

Signed

J W Leabh, Hov.B Division

(17293) 897465 400m 1/73 G.W.B.Ltd. Gp.863

LKS NR 852/9

RR MODUK ARMY

RR DAMASCUS

RR BEIRUT

GR 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 090800Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
12 JUN 1974
NB R10/1

As not to stimulating interest, I think?
Mr. [illegible]
No [illegible] 11/6
pa

MOD DISTRIBUTION
MED

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EBR OF 9 JUNE ALSO TO DAMASCUS AND BEIRUT FOR D.A.

FOR CAMERON DEF SALES 1B FROM SANDERS.
TANK TRANSPORTERS FOR IRAQ.
YOUR EBR 041400Z JUNE AND FIELDS EBR/EDW/FOH 300945Z OF MAY 73.
MUCH OF WHAT FOLLOWS IS HEARSAY.
IT WAS UNDERSTOOD FROM MY PREDECESSOR AND REF THAT IRAQ ARMY APPROACHED LEYLANDS FOR 700 SCAMMELL TYPE TANK TPTS MID 73 BUT UK EXPORT LICENCCE WAS REFUSED.
SUBSEQUENTLY AN ORDER FOR 400 WAS PLACED WITH FOHN OF W.GERMANY IN ABOUT NOV/DEC 73.
IT IS BELIEVED THAT FOHN WOULD BE UNABLE TO PRODUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER REQUIRED BY SYRIA AND IRAQ AND FURTHER APPROACHES WERE MADE TO FRENCH FIRMS FOR SYRIAS REQUIREMENTS.

MCCLUNEY

BT

NNNN

(49)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
13 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
**London SW1**

**Telephone 01-**

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference IA . h13/6
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 12 June 1974

Dear Ogun,

CARTRIDGE EJECTOR RELEASE UNITS FOR IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 6 June about the supply of 80 Cartridge Ejector Release Units No 1 Mk 3 to Iraq.

2. There are no political objections to the supply of these items.

3. I am copying this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
Colin G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

50

GRS 630
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
15 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

FM BAGHDAD 171100Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 215 OF 17 JUNE 1974, INFO
DEF SALES IB AND DI 4.

PS please
Telegram w. 1A.
21/6

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ.

1. AT MFA MEETING TODAY SD TAQA RAISED WITH ME SALE OF HS 1182 HAWK TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND CYMBELINE RADAR TO IRAQ.

2. TAQA SAID IRAQ NOW WISHED TO PURCHASE THESE ITEMS AND REQUESTED A FIRM OFFER BY 31 JULY FOR HAWK TRAINER AND NOW FOR CYMBELINE. HE ASKED FOR OUR OFFER ON AIRCRAFT TO BE GIVEN TO HIM BY ME OR TO CGS BY SANDERS.

we must avoid this - it could lead to a govt-to-govt [illegible].

v. odd when talking with [illegible] the Iraqis agreed a contract with Cymbeline manufacturers a few days later.
21/6

3. TO DATE ENQUIRIES AND PRESSURES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT SANDERS AS FOLLOWS FOR HS 1182.

A) APPROACH BY DIR AIR TRAINING REPORTED TO DEF SALES AND DEF DEPT IN TEL EDW/FOH 070800Z FEB. FOR LITERATURE COST AND DELIVERY DATES.

B) BACKGROUND LETTER TO DEF SALES 10/7 OF 18 FEB. (15)

C) FCO REPLY TEL NO 031 OF 20 FEB.

D) SECOND APPROACH BY DIR AIR TRAINING REPORTED TO DEF SALES AND DEF DEPT IN LETTER 10/7 OF 16 MAR. MINIMUM REQUIREMENT FOR 30 X AIRCRAFT. (£26 m)

E) DIR AIR TRAINING MADE DIRECT APPROACH TO HS DURING VISIT TO U.K. 20 MAR TO MID APR.

/ F)

F) SANDERS DISCUSSED WITH M.E. DEPT. DEF DEPT AND DEF SALES ON VISIT END APR.

G) APPROX PRICE OF £875,000 AND DELIVERY DATE OF 2 YEARS PASSED TO IRAQIS WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT AS A RESULT OF DEF SALES SIG COPY TO NENAD FCO EBR 131600Z MAY.

H) FURTHER APPROACHES MADE BY IAF IN JUNE. IAF HAVE LITERATURE AND ALL UP TO DATE HS REPORTS.

4. FOR CYMBELINE.

A) REPS FROM IRAQ MOD VISITED EMI 1973 TO VIEW.

B) CORRIS OF EMI VISITED DIR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES MAR 74 REPORTED TO SANDERS IRAQ REQUEST FOR INITIAL ORDER OF 12 CYMBELINE EQPTS WORTH APPROX. £4M.

C) SANDERS REPORTED FACTS ON VISIT TO DEF SALES.

D) DIR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES SUMMONED SANDERS TO MOD FOR ANSWER ON CYMBELINE. FACTS REPORTED TO DEF SALES IN LETTER 10/41 OF 12 JUNE AND SIGNAL EBR 141400Z JUNE.

E) CORRIS ARRIVES BAGHDAD TOMORROW.

5. THIS IS ONLY PART OF SEVERAL ENQUIRIES FOR EQUPT OF NON HARDWARE NATURE AND IRAQS STATED INTENTION OF WISHING TO PURCHASE MORE EQPT FROM US. MARCONIS ALSO INVOLVED WITH RADAR ZB 298, SANDERS LETTER 10/7 OF 15 MAY TO DEF SALES REFERS, AND DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES IN PROCESS OF COMPILING LIST OF ALL IRAQI DEMANDS PUT THROUGH THEIR DEF ATTACHE IN BRUSSELS IN LAST YEAR WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS.

/6.

6. SANDERS HAS BEEN TOLD BY IRAQI MOD THAT THEY ARE WELL AWARE THAT WITH OUR COMMITMENTS TO IRAN AND KUWAIT WE WOULD NOT ENTERTAIN BIDS FOR OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BUT THAT THERE ARE MANY ITEMS THAT THEY WOULD LIKE FROM US WHICH DO NOT FALL INTO THIS CATEGORY. YOU MAY THINK THIS MFA APPROACH AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE PACE ON DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ, AND TO GAUGE THE DEPTH OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS.

MCCLUNEY

[SENT TO DCC]

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
PUSD
IRD
GIPD
NEWS D
PS
PS/MR ENNALS
PS/PUS
MR CAMPBELL
SIR G ARTHUR
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON
Defence Sales Dist.

3

RECORDED IN REGISTRY No 35
30 APR 1974
Spare - Original MBP10/6

Mr Burrows 29/4 N.B.
Mr Rafter
then R spoken and pa.
29/4

Copy sent to DS13

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 60

CYPHER CAT A
FM TEHRAN 270800Z
CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 204 OF 27 APRIL.1974
INFO PARIS, MODUK.

DEFENCE SALES

I WAS INFORMED RELIABLY BUT IN STRICT CONFIDENCE YESTERDAY THAT GENERAL TOUFANIAN (WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PROCUREMENT FOR THE IRANIAN ARMED FORCES) HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED BY THE SHAH TO PURCHASE NOTHING MORE FROM THE FRENCH FOLLOWING RECENT PUBLICITY FOR FRENCH ARMS DEALS WITH IRAQ.

PARSONS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

F I L E S:
DEFENCE DEPT
MED
WED
PUSD
IRD
GIPD
NEWS D
PS/MR. ENNALS
PS/MR. HATTERSLEY
SIR G. ARTHUR
MR. THOMSON
MOD(INTERNAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

~~50~~

51

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
15 JUN 1974
NBR 10/1

RESTRICTED

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

Your reference 1A Q 18/6.

Our reference ~~NBR 10/2~~

Date 17 June 1974

Chancery
British Embassy
TEHRAN

Dear Chancery,

ARMS SALES: IRAQ

1 The Iraqis have placed an order (copy attached) with MOD for a mixed bag of military aids described as artillery ancillary equipment. The stuff is harmless and can probably be purchased from non-military sources. Normally, it would not be considered necessary to oppose such a sale but Sir Lester Suffield is hesitant on this occasion in case the Iranians should take exception. I should be grateful for confirmation that we can reassure Sir Lester on this point.

Yours ever,

Peter Raftery

P A Raftery
Middle East Department

RESTRICTED

(52)

Inter MOD
Mr Raftery
Any objections pse?
Colm B Lamb 12/6

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

RECEIVED IN
No 35
16 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 11 June, 1974.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request from Hawker Siddeley Aviation Ltd. on behalf of IRAQ for supply of Qty.2 Relay Series Type 'B' with Mod. EL.1268. The Relay is a maintenance item used on Siddeley Hunter aircraft as an arming electrical device and could be supplied from RAF stocks.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the supply of these stores.

Yours sincerely,

No MOD objection.
14/6

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Material Dept.)
Sales 1b

MBD

53

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
16 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference

Our reference

Date 18 June 1974

Dear Ogun,

1. Please refer to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 June to Miss McIntosh about the supply of Qty 2 Relay Series Type 'B' to Iraq.

2. There are no political objections to the supply of these stores.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to recipients of yours.

Yours sincerely
Colin G Lane

C G LANE
Defence Department

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

(54)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
20 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

GRS 100

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 171230Z JUNE.

UK EYES ONLY ← [Sic]

Mr. Bu 18/6

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 17 JUNE 1974.

Mr Raftery

DIG FOH.
FROM SANDERS.

E M.A. 19/6

FRENCH MA.

YOUR FOH 141200Z JUNE REFERS.

1. FRENCH MA LEFT BAGHDAD 31 MAY WITH WIFE ON LEAVE RETURNING BAGHDAD 7 JULY.

2. THERE WAS RUMOUR IN MA GROUP THAT HE WAS LOOKING AFTER ARMS DELEGATION FROM IRAQ WHILST IN FRANCE.

3. SPOKE TO FRENCH COUNSELLOR SAILLARD ON LINES OF PARA 2 ABOVE. HE DENIED THAT MILITARY DELEGATION WAS VISITING FRANCE. THAT MA WAS PURELY ON LEAVE EXCEPT FOR ANNUAL PILOT REFRESHER TRG. HE DID AGREE THAT FROM TIME TO TIME IRAQI MILITARY PERSONNEL VISITED FRANCE TO DISCUSS FURTHER MILITARY SUPPLIES AND PROVISION OF SPARE PARTS BUT TO THE BEST OF HIS KNOWLEDGE NO ONE WAS THERE AT THE MOMENT.

4. I KNOW SAILLARD WELL AND I BELIEVE HIM.

MCCLUNEY
BT

FCO694/E055/19

55

LKS NR 948/19

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
21 JUN 1974
NBR 10/1

00 DEFENCE SALES MODUK ARMY

00 FCO

Mr. Boynton.

GR 130

MOD DISTRIBUTION

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 190915Z

MED

CONFIDENTIAL

These visas have been cleared 20/6

TO IMMEDIATE DEFENCE SALES 1B TEL NO DIG RBU/RBU OF 19 JUNE
INFO IMMEDIATE TO FCO FOR DEF DEPT AND ME DEPT.

VISAS FOR 13 IRAQI AIR FORCE AND ARMY OFFICERS TO ATTEND ICL AND ARMY COMPUTER TRG IN UK.

ONE. DEPUTY CHAIRMAN ICL ARRIVING BAGHDAD TODAY TO FORMALLY SIGN CONTRACT WITH CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF.

TWO. IRAQIS ACCUSING ICL OF DELIBERATLEY PREVARICATING OVER ISSUE OF VISAS DESPITE FACT THAT THEY KNOW ITS OUT OF ICL HANDS.

THREE. ATMOSPHERE IS UNPLEASANT AND COULD JEOPORDISE THE FUTURE BUSINESS HERE WHICH COULD BE SUBSTANTIAL.

FOUR. ANY DELAY ON VISAS FOR 13 OFFICERS BEYOND SATURDAY 22 JUN COULD SERIOUSLY DISRUPT AN ALREADY REORGANISED COMPLEX TRAINING PROGRAMME.

FIVE. COULD YOU ASK FCO VISA DEPT TO TRY AND SIGNAL ANY ANSWER ON THESE VISA APPLICATIONS BEFORE OFFICIAL SIGNING OF CONTRACE PM 20 JUNE.

1027z

MCCLUNEY

BT

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT-A-
GPS 274
FM FCO 201700Z

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21 JUN 1974
(NBR 10/1)

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TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 237 OF 20/6/74 INFO BAGHDAD KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. THE IRAQIS ARE SHOWING INCREASING INTEREST IN PURCHASING ARMS FROM US. HM CHARGÉ IN BAGHDAD HAS REPORTED THAT THEY ARE COMPILING A LIST BASED ON REQUESTS FOR PURCHASES WHICH WE HAVE REFUSED IN THE PAST. IN THE MEANTIME, THEY HAVE REQUESTED AN OFFER OF SALE FOR THE HS 1182 HAWK TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND THE CYMBELINE MORTAR-LOCATING RADAR BY 31 JULY. THE BUSINESS COULD BE WORTH £30 M.

2. THE HS 1182 IS A SUBSONIC AIRCRAFT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO REPLACE THE HUNTERS AND GNATS IN THEIR TRAINING ROLES, THOUGH IT CAN BE MODIFIED TO A GROUND ATTACK FUNCTION. IT HAS ONLY JUST GONE INTO PRODUCTION AND HAS NOT BEEN SOLD OVERSEAS: DELIVERY IS TWO YEARS. CYMBELINE IS PURELY DEFENSIVE AND THERE ARE AT PRESENT SECURITY RESTRICTIONS ON SUPPLYING IT TO IRAQ. A FURTHER FACTOR IS THAT IRAN, KUWAIT AND SAUDI ARABIA HAVE SHOWN AN INTEREST IN IT.

3. HM CHARGÉ SUGGESTS THAT THIS REQUEST IS AN ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE PACE WITH US ON DEFENCE SALES AND TO GAUGE THE DEPTH OF OUR DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. WE HAVE NOT YET CONSULTED MINISTERS. BEFORE DOING SO WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SHAH'S CURRENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS SALES TO IRAQ (A) IN GENERAL AND (B) BY US (BEARING IN MIND THAT WE WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO CONSIDER OTHER THAN NON-OFFENSIVE AND RELATIVELY UNSOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT), IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REACTION TO THE FRENCH DEALS AS REPORTED IN YRTELNO. 204. YRTELNO. 211 IS ALSO RELEVANT.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO
DS13 MOD
SALES 1 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

GR 300

FM TEHRAN 230950Z JUN

57

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
25 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

Burton

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 324 OF 23 JUNE 1974 RPTD FOR INFO TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, JEDDAH.

YOUR TEL NO 237 (56) : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. AS YOU KNOW THE SHAH IS GENERALLY SENSITIVE ON THIS SUBJECT:

(A) BECAUSE OF HIS UNCERTAIN RELATIONS WITH IRAQ AND HIS EXPOSED WESTERN FRONTIER,

(B) BECAUSE OF THE KURDISH QUESTION.

(C) BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE IRAQI THREATS TO KUWAIT AND OTHER GULF STATES.

THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN IN TROUBLE WITH HIM FOR SUPPLYING OR SUPPORTING THE IRAQIS: SO HAVE THE INDIANS. ALTHOUGH IN THE CURRENT MOOD OF EUPHORIA CHARACTERISING FRANCO/IRANIAN RELATIONS, ON THE EVE OF THE SHAH'S STATE VISIT, PAST SINS MAY BE BEING OVERLOOKED, WE SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE SHAH WILL KEEP A CLOSE EYE ON WHAT IS BEING SUPPLIED TO IRAQ BY ANY OF HIS FRIENDS, ALTHOUGH OF COURSE IRAQ'S ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THE SOVIET UNION ARE HIS PRINCIPAL WORRY.

2. THESE CONSIDERATIONS APPLY PARTICULARLY IN THE CASE OF BRITAIN, A CENTO ALLY AND MAJOR SOURCE OF ARMS FOR IRAN HERSELF. THE SHAH WOULD CERTAINLY EXPECT US TO CONSULT HIM IN ADVANCE ABOUT ANY SALE OF ARMS TO THE IRAQIS. I DO NOT THINK HE WOULD AUTOMATICALLY REACT ADVERSELY. I HAVE NOT MYSELF BROACHED THIS SUBJECT WITH HIM, BUT MY PREDECESSOR'S APPROACH OVER HOVERCRAFT, ADMITTEDLY BEFORE THE RECENT DETERIORATION OF IRAQI/IRANIAN RELATIONS, WAS RECEIVED REALISTICALLY AND SYMPATHETICALLY (SEE ARBUTHNOTT'S LETTER OF 31 DECEMBER 1973 TO BURTON, MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT, NOT COPIED TO BAGHDAD). THE SHAH MIGHT WELL TAKE THE VIEW IN PRINCIPLE THAT ANYTHING WHICH IS LIKELY TO LOOSEN THE SOVIET HOLD WOULD BE WORTH DOING.

/ 3. EVEN

3. EVEN IF HE TOOK THIS VIEW I CANNOT BE SURE HOW HE WOULD REACT IN THE SPECIFIC CASES OF THE HS 1182 AND CYMBELINE. THE FORMER, IF MODIFIED, COULD CLEARLY BE USED OFFENSIVELY AGAINST IRAN DURING BORDER CLASHES. EQUALLY, IT COULD BE USED AGAINST THE KURDS. CYMBELINE, ALTHOUGH ''PURELY DEFENSIVE'', WOULD HELP THE IRAQIS IN ANY OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE KURDS TO THE EXTENT THAT IT HELPED THEM TO LOCATE AND NEUTRALISE KURDISH MORTARS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CASE WOULD NOT APPEAR TO BE AS CLEAR AS THAT AGAINST THE SALE OF TANK TRANSPORTERS TO IRAQ (TEHRAN TEL NO 637 OF 1973 NOT REPEATED).

4. I RECOMMEND THAT, IF IT IS DECIDED THAT WE SHOULD PROBE IRAQI INTENTIONS FURTHER, I SHOULD FIRST BE AUTHORISED TO TAKE THE SHAH INTO OUR CONFIDENCE AND THAT A FINAL DECISION SHOULD BE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF HIS REACTIONS.

PARSONS

FILES:

MED
DEF D
NENAD
MR. CAMPBELL
MR. WEIR

COPIES TO:
DS 13, MOD
SALES 1, MOD

58

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CYPHER/CAT A
ROUTINE 201100Z JUN 1974
FM MOD UK
TO BRIT EMB BAGHDAD
INFO FCO NENAD

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
25 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

~~RECEIV~~
~~REGISTRY~~
~~20 JUN 1974~~

1A

BT
CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR

55

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON PD YOUR 190915Z REFERS PD
APPLICATIONS FOR BISAS DID NOT ARRIVE IN FCO UNTIL 18 JUNE PD
NOW BEING PROCESSED WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED PD FCO WILL SIGNAL
YOU BEFORE CLOSE OF PLAY ON FRIDAY PD
BT

FILES
DEFENCE D
MED
NENAD
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

59

GR 70

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25 JUN 1974
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[illegible] (67)

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 240945Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FOH OF 24 JUNE 1974
INFO ROUTINE TO FCO AND ESBOT.

FOR MDS 1B FROM DA.
EMERGENCY BRIDGING EQPT FOR RAILWAYS.

1. WE HAVE HAD A HIGH LEVEL APPROACH FROM MFA ASKING US TO SUPPLY THIS EQPT IN SPANS UP TO 40 FEET.

2. THEY NEED THE EQPT URGENTLY AND IF WE ARE ABLE AND AGREE TO SUPPLY THEY WISH TO SEND A DELEGATION TO UK TO VIEW EQUIPMENT AND DISCUSS DETAILS.

3. NO OTHER DETAILS SUPPLIED.

MCCLUNEY

[SENT TO DCC]

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO:

DTI (ESBOT)

60

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25 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

GRS 110

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 240445Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 224 OF 24 JUNE 1974.
INFO ROUTINE TEHERAN, KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

(56)

YOUR TEL NO 237 TO TEHERAN. CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. IN FACT IRAQIS REQUESTED OFFER ON CYMBELINE NOW AND HS 1182'S BY 31 JULY.

/61

2. AS YOU KNOW FROM TEL 220830Z TO MODUK ARMY, CORRIS OF EMI AGREED A CONTRACT FOR SALE OF TWELVE RADARS, 4 REPAIR VEHICLES AND ONE BASE WKSP IN BAGHDAD ON 20 JUNE. THE APPEARANCE OF CORRIS WAS FORTUITOUS BUT IS NEVERTHELESS A QUICK RESPONSE TO IRAQI REQUEST OF 17 JUNE.

3. U/SECY TAQA (MFA) HAD THE IMPRESSION WHEN HE SPOKE TO ME THAT DELAY IN CYMBELINE OFFER WAS DUE TO EMI'S NEGOTIATIONS ON EXPORT LICENCE. I MADE NO COMMENT.

4. CONTRACT IS FIRMLY SUBJECT TO THE ISSUE OF A LICENCE AND I HOPE TAQA DOES NOT THINK THAT THE MATTER HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO: DS 13 MOD
SALES 1 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Britain of Defence Sales 1 told me that Mr Corris of E.M.I. had proceeded with these negotiations in the face of this advice to the contrary. Cymbeline carries an MOD Confidential security classification and is not therefore available to Iraq, which is not allowed any classified material. 28/6

(61)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
26 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27
24 JUN 1974

GRS 170
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM BAGHDAD 220830Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK ARMY TEL OF 22 JUNE 1974, INFO PRIORITY DEF DEPT AND PRIORITY FCO (MED).

DIG EBR.
FOR MDS 1 B.
FROM SANDERS.

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ.

1. CORRIS AND BROOKS (MILITARY CONTRACTS MANAGER) FROM EMI COMPLETED DISCUSSIONS WITH IRAQ MOD 20 JUN.

2. A CONTRACT WAS QUICKLY AGREED FOR THE PROVISION OF 12 RADARS WITH SPARES, 4 MOBILE REPAIR VEHICLES AND ONE BASE WKSP.

3. THE CONTRACT HAS NOT BEEN SIGNED BUT IRAQIS SAY THEY WILL DO SO AS SOON AS THEY RECIEVE IT.

4. CONTRACT IS SUBJECT TO THE GRANTING OF AN EXPORT LICENSE BY HMG. IF A LECENSE IS ISSUED BEFORE 1 JAN 75 CONTRACT IS VALID. IF A LICENSE IS ISSUED AFTER 1 JAN 75 PRICES ARE SUBJECT TO RE-NEGOTIATION WITHIN 2 MONTHS.

/5. ALTHOUGH

CONFIDENTIAL

5. ALTHOUGH CORRIS EXPECTED DIFFICULTIES WITH IRAQIS OVER EXPORT LICENCE QUESTION THESE DID NOT ARISE, OTHER THAN THEIR REQUEST THAT EMI SHOULD APPLY FOR THE LICENSE.

6. CONTRACT IS WORTH ABOUT £4 M. AND IRAQIS SAID THEY WOULD WANT MORE. THEY INTENDED BUYING LANDROVERS TO TOW CYMBELINE AND BEDFORD TRUCKS TO MOUNT REPAIR VEHICLES ON.

MCCLUNEY

[SENT TO D C C ]

FILES
DEFENCE DEPT
M E D
MR THOMSON
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

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62

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26 JUN 1974
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GRS 45

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 250630Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 228 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. TWO MIFTS CONTAIN BACKGROUND WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE IN CONSOLIDATED FORM AND WILL NOT OTHERWISE REACH YOU 'TILL 5 JULY BAG.

2. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY TO OTHER POSTS. AND MOD.

I do not think it is necessary to repeat either telegram.

25/6.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D

CONFIDENTIAL

63

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
26 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

GRS 220

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 250635Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 229 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. KNOWN BRITISH INTEREST IN SALES TO IRAQ MOD

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| A) | MILITARY HOSPITAL. | £50-70M |
| B) | 30 X HS 1182. | £30M. |
| C) | CYMBELINE RADAR (POSSIBLE FURTHER ORDERS) | £4M. |
| D) | ICL COMPUTERS. CONTRACT SIGNED AND SUBJECT TO EXPORT LICENCE. | £1M |
| E) | 500 X LWB LAND ROVERS. (FURTHER 2950 L/R'S ARE UNDER CONSIDERATION OR ON ORDER BY OTHER MINISTRIES). | £0.5M |
| F) | MEDICAL EQUIPMENT. | £0.5M |
| G) | SPARES FOR EXISTING BRITISH EQUIPMENT. | £0.5M |
| H) | RANGEFINDERS. (probably laser range finders for tanks) | |
| I) | NIGHT SIGHTS. | |
| J) | SIMFIRE. | |
| K) | MARCONI ZB 298 TANK STABILISATION KITS. SENSOR | |
| L) | BRITT~~AI~~EN NORMAN ISLANDERS. | |
| M) | RACAL COMMS SYSTEMS. | £3-5M |
| N) | ~~BATTLE~~ RATION STORES. | £0.5M |
| O) | PLESSEY CONVERSION ~~FR~~RUSSIAN RADAR. | £0.5M |
| P) | DENNIS FIRE ENGINES. | £0.8M |

THE TOTAL INCLUDING HOSPITAL IS OVER £100M BUT THERE ARE NO WEAPONS IN THE LIST.

## 2. DEFENCE TRAINING.

SUMMARY OF CURRENT BIDS FOR COURSES IN U.K.

| | COURSES | PLACES |
|---|---|---|
| IRAQ AIR FORCE (IAF) | 16 | 46 |
| IRAQ ARMY (IA) | 53 | 115 |

IRAQ MOD HAS ASKED FOR HELP IN ESTABLISHING

A) AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL SCHOOL.
B) ENGLISH LANGUAGE SCHOOL (IN ADDITION TO USE THEY MAKE OF IDELTI)

AND HAS REQUESTED ADVICE ON UPDATING TRAINING IN

(I) IAF STAFF COLLEGE
(II) IA STAFF COLLEGE
(III) SCHOOL OF JOINT AIR WARFARE

WE SUPPLY TRAINING PUBLICATIONS.

MCCLUNEY

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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NENAD
EESD
DEFENCE D
PUSD
N AM D
NEWS D
RESEARCH D (SOV SECTION)
(AMER SECTION)

ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION

DEFENCE SALES

RS 370

64

CYPHER CAT A

TOP COPY

RECEI
REGISTRY No 35
26 JUN 1974
MB 2/10 1

FM BAGHDAD 250715Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TEL NO 230 OF 25 JUNE 1974.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO EXPLAIN MORE FULLY IRAQS REASONS FOR ASKING FOR HS 1182 AND CYMBELINE AS SEEN FROM BAGHDAD.

2. CLEARLY IT IS NOT BECAUSE THEY WISH TO BECOME WESTERN ORIENTED IN THEIR DEFENCE SUPPLY. THEY DO NOT WISH TO OFFEND THEIR EASTERN BLOC FRIENDS AT THIS STAGE. RATHER THEY WISH TO MAKE A SMALL SHOW OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE, RESPOND TO MILITARY PRESSURE FOR BETTER TOOLS, AND EXPLICITLY DEMONSTRATE TO IRAN AND KUWAIT THAT BRITAIN HAS RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THE BAATH IN IRAQ AND IS WILLING TO DO BUSINESS OVER A WIDE RANGE INCLUDING SOME DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

3. THE CHRONIC INEFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES WAS BROUGHT HOME TO IRAQIS DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. MANY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO SANDERS THEIR NEED TO RETAIN AND EXPAND THEIR OLD LINKS WITH THE BRITISH SERVICES AND THEIR USE OF OUR EQUIPMENT AND METHODS. THEY HAVE SUFFERED FROM OVER DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND WILL NOW TAKE THE BEST THAT OTHERS CAN OFFER E.G. FRANCE, EGYPT, INDIA AND OURSELVES.

4. BUT THERE IS NO POSSIBILTY OF THEM ACQUIRING OFFENSIVE HARDWARE FROM US. TAQA IS AWARE OF OUR TREATY COMMITTMENTS, AND HIS OWN. ? THE KUWAITIS AND IRANIANS COULD PERHAPS BE PERSUADED TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS IN ALL OUR INTERESTS TO HAVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, TO COUNTERACT SOVIET INFLUENCE AND BRING SOME WESTERN COMMON SENSE TO THEIR DEALINGS WITH THEIR

/ NEIGHBOURS.

NEIGBOURS. IF THIS MEANS PANDERING TO THEIR INDEPENDENCE WITH RADAR SETS, TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND COMPUTERS IT DOES NOT SEEM A HIGH PRICE TO PAY.

5. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD PASSING THROUGH A LONG PERIOD OF MUTUAL SUSPICION, PARTICULARLY WHERE WE HAVE DEEP SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINKS TO BUILD ON AS IN IRAQ.

6. IF IN THE END WE DECIDE THERE ARE CERTAIN GOODS WE CANNOT SELL HERE, IRAQIS MAY MORE READILY ACCEPT THE POLITICAL EXPLANATION OF OUR DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE TENSION IN THE ✓ AREA THAN AN IMPLICATION THAT WE CANNOT RISK UPSETTING THE SHAH.

MCCLUNEY

| DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION | ADDITIONAL DISTRIBUTION |
|---|---|
| MED<br>NENAD<br>EESD<br>DEFENCE D<br>PUSD<br>N AM D<br>NEWS D<br>RESEARCH D (SOV SECTION)<br>(AMER SECTION) | DEFENCE SALES |

CONFIDENTIAL

65

GRS 70
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
26 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

TOP COPY

FM BAGHDAD 240645Z JUNE.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 227 OF 24 JUNE 1974.
INFO PRIORITY TEHERAN.

TEHERAN 324 TO FCO. PARA 3.

HS 1182 FOR IRAQ.

AS A TRAINER THIS AIRCRAFT CANNOT BE DESCRIBED AS OFFENSIVE. WE DOUBT IF THE IRAQIS HAVE THE CAPABILITY TO CONVERT TO A GROUND ATTACK FUNCTION, AND IN ANY CASE THEY HAVE ALREADY MANY AIRCRAFT IN THIS ROLE. USE OF THE HAWK TRAINER WILL ENABLE THEM TO EXPAND THEIR PILOT TRAINING PROGRAMME AND RELY LESS ON OUTSIDERS (E.G. THE RUSSIANS, THE INDIANS AND OURSELVES). IT WILL NOT NECESSARILY IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF THEIR PILOTS.

Actually the Hawk can be readily converted because the training version is already wired up for this: but I agree with Mr. McCluney that the Iraqis would hardly buy this aircraft if they want a ground attack vehicle.

28/6.

MCCLUNEY

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR

COPIES TO: DS 13 MOD
SALES 1 MOD

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 JUN 1974
NBR10/1

RR TEHRAN

GR 380

CYPHER/CAT A

FM F C O 271520Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE TEHRAN TELNO 246 OF 27 JUNE 1974.

FOLLOWING TELEGRAM NOW REPEATED TO YOU AT REQUEST OF DEPARTMENT WAS RECEIVED FROM BAGHDAD TELNO 230 OF 25 JUNE.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. IT MAY BE HELPFUL TO EXPLAIN MORE FULLY IRAQS REASONS FOR ASKING FOR H S 1182 AND CYMBELINE AS SEEN FROM BAGHDAD.

2. CLEARLY IT IS NOT BECAUSE THEY WISH TO BECOME WESTERN ORIENTED IN THEIR DEFENCE SUPPLY. THEY DO NOT WISH TO OFFEND THEIR EASTER BLOC FRIENDS AT THIS STAGE. RATHER TJEHEY WISH TO MAKE A SMALL SHOW OF THEIR INDEPENDENCE, RESPOND TO MILITARY PRESSURE FOR BETTER TOOLS, AND EXPLICITLY DEMONSTRATE TO IRAN AND KUWAIT THAT BRITAIN HAS RENEWED RELATIONS WITH THE BAATH IN IRAQ AND IS WILLING TO DO BUSINESS OVER A WIDE RANGE INCLUDING SOME DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

3. THE CHRONIC INEFFICIENCY OF THEIR ARMED FORCES WAS BROUGHT HOME TO IRAQIS DURING THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. MANY SENIOR OFFICERS HAVE EXPRESSED TO SANDERS THEIR NEED TO RETAIN AND EXPAND THEIR OLD LINKS WITH THE BRITISH SERVICES AND THEIR USE OF OUR EQUIPMENT AND METHODS. THEY HAVE SUFFERED FROM OVER DEPENDENCE ON RUSSIA AND WILL NOW TAKE THE BEST THAT OTHERS CAN OFFER E.G. FRANCE, EGYPT, INDIA AND OURSELVES.

4. BUT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THEM ACQUIRING OFFENSIVE HARDWARE FROM US. TAQA IS AWARE OF OUR TREATY COMMITTMENTS, AND HIS OWN. THE KUWAITIS AND IRANIANS COULD PERHAPS BE

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4. BUT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THEM ACQUIRING OFFENSIVE HARDWARE FROM US. TAQA IS AWARE OF OUR TREATY COMMITTMENTS, AND HIS OWN. THE KUWAITIS AND IRANIANS COULD PERHAPS BE PERSUADED TO UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS IN ALL OUR INTERESTS TO HAVE THE WIDEST POSSIBLE RANGE OF CONTACTS WITH IRAQ, TO COUNTERACT SOVIET INFLUENCE AND BRING SOME WESTERN COMMON SENSE TO THEIR DEALINGS WITH THEIR NEIGHBOURS. IF THIS MEANS PANDERING TO THEIR INDEPENDENCE WITH RADAR SETS, TRAINER AIRCRAFT AND COMPUTERS IT DOES NOT SEE A HIGH PRICE TO PAY.

5. IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE ARAB WORLD PASSING THROUGH A LONG PERIOD OF MUTUAL SUSPICION, PARTICULARLY WHERE WE HAVE DEEP SOCIO-ECONOMIC LINKS TO BUILD ON AS IN IRAQ.

6. IF IN THE END WE DECIDE THERE ARE CERTAIN GOODS WE CANNOT SELL HERE, IRAQIS MAY MORE READILY ACCEPT THE POLITICAL EXPLANATION OF OUR DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE TENSION IN THE AREA THAN AN IMPLICATION THAT WE CANNOT RISK UPSETTING THE SHAH.

CALLAGHAN

NNNN

Registry No.

**DRAFT** TELEGRAM

Type 1 +

**SECURITY CLASSIFICATION**

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

**PRIVACY MARKING**

.......................... In Confidence

To:-

HM AMBASSADOR TEHRAN

From

Anderson MOD

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

Held after discussion Wright/
Anderson

Your tel no 237: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. EMI have pressed us for approval for the sale of 12 Cymbelines with supporting equipment to Iraq. They are aware of the Iranian sensitivity about supplies to Iraq but they nevertheless wish to go ahead with the export if it is approved by HMG.

2. We accept your view that the Shah should be consulted in advance. In the circumstances we would be grateful if unofficial soundings could be taken of the Shah's attitude towards this potential sale. In order to keep matters on an informal basis perhaps the best way we can deal with the matter would be for Reporter to be asked to take the necessary soundings.

Hold!

3. It would perhaps be as well to mention that the Iraqis seem anxious to improve their relations with the UK and that for many reasons, some of which are to the Shah's benefit, it would be desirable if this came about. Our attitude towards the sale of military equipment to Iraq will be an important aspect of our dealings with them. From our point of view the situation will not be easy, since they are asking for a number of items which we would probably refuse to supply.

/However,

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

6195 D073528 400M 2/74 Cr.P.C. 839/3

However, Cymbeline seems to us to be relatively innocuous and our willingness to supply this item might bring about an improvement ~~to supply this~~ in Anglo/Iraqi relations which ultinately holds some benefits for Iran.

IMMEDIATE Anderson MOD ext 6828

Mr Anderson would like clearance from Patrick or Terry first as soon as possible before he sends it off

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 JUN 1974
MBR10/1

[illegible] 68.

CYPHER CAT A

PRI ROU 251030Z JUN,1974
FM MOD UK
TO BRIT EMB BAGHDAD
INFO FCO(NENAD)
ESBOT

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FOH/FBR (59).

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON YOUR 240945Z REFERS PD EMERGENCY BRIDGING EQUIPT FOR RAILWAYS PD

1. HAVE SPOKEN TO MR BRAMWELL OF THOMAS STOREY ENGRS LTD 8 SOUTH WHARF LONDON W2 PD FIRM CAN SUPPLY SUCH BRIDGES AND CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE SOME IN SERVICE IN SOUTH AMERICA PD THEY CAN PROVIDE PHOTO GRAPHS IF REQUIRED PD CAN ALSO SHOW VISITORS SECTIONS OF BRIDGES AT THEIR FACTORY PD

2. BRAMWELL INFORMED ME THAT FIRM HAD ALREADY HAD PASSED TO THEM VIA DORMAN LONG A SIMILAR AND POSSIBLY IDENTICAL REQUEST IN LETTER FORM FROM IRAQI GOVT PD

3. SUGGEST DIRECT APPROACH TO THOMAS STOREY PD

4. HAVE ALSO SPOKEN TO FAIREY ENGINEERING WHO ARE UNABLE TO SUPPLY PD

FILES

DEFENCE DEPT
MED
NENAD
MR THOMSON
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DEPT OF TRADE,
1, VICTORIA STREET

Yes: this should be passed on to the DOT [illegible] now - it is not a military sale.
28/6

CONFIDENTIAL

584-741-6

MOD ~~54~~

68

EMBASSY OF THE
REPUBLIC OF IRAQ
21, QUEEN'S GATE.
LONDON, S.W.7.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 JUN 1974
MBR 10/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
27 JUN 1974
~~NBR 1/2/11~~

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 19
27 JUN 1974

No. 428

Enter
W Raftery.

28/6

I.A. 1/7

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq presents its compliments to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and has the honour to inform them of the desire expressed by the Iraqi delegation from the Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Defence to visit the United Kingdom and to view quickly installed bridges which compensate for the destroyed or ruined railway bridges, whose spans exceed 40 feet.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq would be most grateful for any assistance the esteemed Ministry would be able to extend.

The Embassy of the Republic of Iraq avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the assurances of its highest consideration.

15.1/7.
Copy to 1. Chancery Bagdad 3 Dept of Trade 1 Victoria Street
2. Mr. Cameron, MoD Sales 1
w/ comment Bagdad tel 240945Z

London, 25th June 1974

See reply at 71

Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
London.

28

MBR10/1

XY33

# REPETITION OF TELEGRAMS

**REGISTRY**
**No.**

(Date) 27.[illegible]6

(Despatched) 1722

## (1) TELEGRAM EXAMINERS COMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT

Please repeat to the posts shown below attached telegram No. Baghdad 230.

~~from~~/to ........................ dated ........................

TEHRAN No. 246 Date 27/6

Flash
En Clair Immediate
Code Priority
Cypher [✓ Routine]

(Signed)

(Dept.) M.E.D.

(Date) 27.6.74.

## (2) DEPARTMENT CONCERNED (for Archives)

(For use in Communications Department)

Security classification 271520 Confidential

Addressed to Routine Tehran telegram No. ........................ of ........................

and to ........................

Following telegram now repeated to you at request of Department

was received from ~~sent to~~ Baghdad telegram No. 230 of 25 June

[Here insert from A to B of attached telegram]

15200
27/6

(230224)897444 10/72 100 pads HPG

nea

69

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
28 JUN 1974

O Ogun Esq
Sales Supply 5b
Ministry of Defence
St Christopher House

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 28 June 1974

I.A. 29/6.

Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ: ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

Thank you for your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 11 June.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of 2 Relay Series Type B for Hawker Hunter aircraft to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely,

Miriam McIntosh.

MISS M R McINTOSH
Defence Department

(70)

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
2 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

~~SORRYY ABOUT THIS MATE~~

Surely HMG's "reactions" are confidential to the [illegible] Company, aren't they? Is this an appropriate message for the DA to pass on?

I wd have thought not 1/7

~~A. CLARK~~ Mr RAFTERY

1/7

VVVZCZCDFA034

DSAO-T-PP BE BAGHDAD
-T-RR FCO MED
DE RBDWC 0738 1791953
PRIORITY ROUTINE 281800Z JUN
FM MODUK PE
TO BE BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED
BT

NO DISTRIBUTION

~~ADVANCE~~ TOP COPY

Hd/MED

CONFIDENTIAL

DIG EBR

FOR SANDERS DA FROM BRITTAIN AD SALES 1B CYMBELINE BROOKS EMI HAS ASKED FOR FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO BE SENT TO GENERAL JENAB THROUGH YOU

QUOTE EMI MANAGEMENT FIND CONTRACTUAL CONDITIONS WE DISCUSSED LAST WEEK TO BE SUITABLE BUT HAVE INSTRUCTED ME TO SEEK THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT. THIS IS IN HAND AND I WILL SIGNAL IMMEDIATELY I HAVE OUR GOVERNMENTS REACTIONS UNQUOTE

GRATEFUL YOUR ASSISTANCE

BT

I have pointed out to Mr. Brittain that the contents of this message might have been more generally expressed. He took the point.

Ext A 1/7

NNNN

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
2 JUL 1974
NBR10/1

IA

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office presents its compliments to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq and has the honour to acknowledge its Note Verbale No 428 of 25 June regarding the proposed visit of an Iraqi delegation to the United Kingdom to view railway emergency bridging equipment.

A similar request has been received by the British Embassy in Baghdad, which is in direct touch with the Iraq Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding this matter

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq the assurances of its highest consideration.

1 July 1974

Embassy of the Republic of Iraq
21-22 Queen's Gate
LONDON SW7 5JG

Hidden Copies:

Chancery, Baghdad
Mr Cameron, MOD Sales 1
Dept of Trade

72

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
5 JUL 1974

MBR10/1

0053.

Mr. Burton 3/7
pc

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

KDFA008
DSAO-T-BRITEMB BAGHDAD
-T-FCO NENAD
-T-ESBOT
DE RBDWC 0803 1832330
PRI 021500Z JUL
FM MODUK
TO BRITEMB BAGHDAD
INFO FCO NENAD
ESBOT
CONFIDENTIAL
DIG OFL/OQB/OYS/FBH/EBR

FOR SANDERS FROM CAMERON YOUR 291000Z JUN REFERS PD EMERGENCY BRIDGING EQUIPT FOR RAILWAYS

1 PD REGRET ROYAL ENGINEERS DO NOT NOW HAVE ANY SUCH EQUIPMENT

2 PD HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT WHEN REQUIRED RAILWAY BRIDGINE EQUIPT IS OBTAINED BY MOD FROM DEPT OF ENVIRONMENT

3 PD HAVE SPOKEN TO DTI WHO WILL NOW HANDLE THIS ENQUIRY

BT

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL Reference..................................

73

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
5 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

Mr Clark 4/7

Mr Williams 4/7

Mr Bowt 4/7

Mr Raf 4/7 E.M.A. 4/7

BLMC AND THE BOYCOTT

1. Lord Greenhill telephoned me on 1 July as a Director of BLMC to say that they had been told that it would help British Leylands to free themselves of the Arab boycott if they were to supply tank transporters to Iraq and Samaritans to Syria. Lord Greenhill assumed (wrongly as it turns out) that his informant had in fact been referring to the supply of Saracens for Syria. Lord Greenhill asked me what were the prospects of BLMC being allowed to supply either equipment.

2. After consulting Mr Craig I have told Lord Greenhill, for his private information, that Ministers have not yet considered the question of supplies for Syria, but that since Samaritans are designed primarily for ambulance purposes their supply to Syria would certainly not automatically be excluded. On tank transporters for Iraq, I told Lord Greenhill that, as he probably recalled, the question had been considered by Ministers in the last Administration, who had concluded that an export licence for tank transporters to Iraq would have to be refused. I told him that this question again had not been considered by the present Administration, but that my personal assessment was that they would a fortiori be opposed to any such contract.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

3 July 1974

cc Mr Craig, NENAD

Mr Corley, Department of Trade

CONFIDENTIAL

(74)

CYPHER

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
8 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

~~MED~~

~~Mr. Wintour~~ M.

RR BAGHDAD

GR 90

NO DISTRIBUTION

ECGD
TRED

CYPHER/CAT A
FM ECGD 011430Z
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

PA. R 18/7

TO ROUTINE BAGHDAD TELNO EXCED 36 OF 1 JULY.
FAIREY ENG HAVE APPROACHED FOR COVER ON SALE OF MOBILE TEMPORARY RUNWAY 3 KM LONG MADE OF ALUMINIUM PLANKS. THERE WILL BE A 200 METRE DISPERSAL AREA. CONTRACT VALUE £3 MILLION ON TERMS 20% W.O., 80% CAD/CILC WITH DELIVERY 6-26 MONTHS D.O.C. BUYER IS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE. ALTHOUGH NOT ON PROHIBITED LIST – presumably not strategic goods destined for the Eastern bloc.
X FAIREY UNSURE WHETHER EXPORT LICENCE WILL BE FINALLY REQUIRED. GRATEFUL FOR URGENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND COMMENTS ON THIS BUSINESS ESPECIALLY WHETHER IT IS TO BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES.

ECGD

NNNN

Mr. Burton 5/7
~~Mr Wallington~~ 5/7
D.o.T. will take this up direct & will let us know Ad.
~~BW in meanwhile.~~ taken 15.
R 4/7

~~Mr Rafferty~~
Any comments?
EB 3/7

~~Please copy w/ comments to Miss MACK, Export Licensing, Room 522 D.o.T.~~ 15. 4/7.

~~Mr Burton.~~
We will need to watch this: I shd have thought we cd say from the criteria already laid down whether X is the case.
RB 3/7

Enter.

75

FCO NR 686/E094/03.

LKS NR 98/3

RR DTI/EXCED

GR 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 030730Z

COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
8 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

2 Xerox

ADVANCE COPY

ECGD.
TRED.
~~MED~~.
EMPA

Mr. Barton
~~Mr Lefley~~

TO ROUTINE ECGD TEL NO EXCED 32 OF 3 JULY.

YOUR EXCED 36 OF 1 JULY.

FAIREY ENGINEERING.

WE HAVE NO INFORMATION ON THIS REQUIREMENT. HOWEVER IT IS POSSIBLE THAT RUNWAY REQUIRED FOR MOSUL AIRPORT, WHICH HAS BEEN TAKEN OVER BY THE MILITARY AND WHICH HAS GROUND WATER PROBLEMS. ALTHOUGH BUYER IS MINISTRY OF DEFENCE RUNWAY MAY WELL BE USED FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES. WE CANNOT SEE ANY REASON WHY THIS BUSIJICI SHOULD BE PROHIBITED AND HOPE YOU CAN AGREE COVER.

sounds very anti-Kurd to me

4/7

18/7

GIDDENS

BT

From: O. Ogun, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1
Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 363

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
19 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

(76)

Your reference

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 3 July, 1974

Letter to MOD MRh 12/8 pa.

Miss McIntosh. This is minor equipment. No objection.

P. Rattray 12/8.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request for the supply of 25 Pdr. Gun Spares to the Iraqi Army.

May we please have your agreement to fulfil this order, valued at £780 approx.

(220) refers

Yours sincerely,

Wait another two weeks.

2?/7

BU 2 weeks

noted CS.

Enter MOD

C 8/7

Mr Rattray.
Any objections pse?
C Strickland 5/7
Defence Dept

Copy to:

Advice pending
BU 2 weeks
MRh 12/8.

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Material Dept.)
Sales 1b

Have held pending a submission on arms sales to Iraq in general. [illegible] 15/7.

MCL 24/7 OPD consideration expected next week. & 8/7 BU again 2 weeks

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl 15/7

~~##~~

77

**British Embassy**
**Tehran**

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
15 JUL 1974
NBR10 | 1

Your reference ~~NBP 10/2~~

Our reference 10/2

Date 3 July 1974

P A Raftery Esq
MED
FCO

Dear Peter,

ARMS SALE TO IRAQ (51) / artillery ancillary equipment

1. Thank you for your letter of 17 June (not to Baghdad). You will no doubt have seen our telegram No.324 of 23 June. (57) Despite the considerations in this telegram, we can see no reason why the Iranians should object to the sale to the Iraqis of the items you mention. We should, therefore, be happy if the sale were to go ahead.

Yours sincerely

Nick Browne.

N W Browne

B. 16/7.

cc Chancery
Baghdad

Please copy w/ comps to Mr. Fayle, MOD DSB

15/7.

P.A. 18/7

CONFIDENTIAL

Put on ~~MOD~~
Mr Rafferty.

(78)

For your comments in due course pse?
[illegible] Lane
Defence Dept 16/7

L 384E

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation* Sales 1b
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605 Telephone ~~01 437 9288 ext~~
Direct Line 01 632 4708
Switchboard 01 632 3333

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY
18 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
16 JUL 1974

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/113/18/1
D/Sales/113/73/2

Date 11th July 1974

Mr. Lane. Thank you.
Sales to Iraq are about to be submitted to OPD

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below please?

1 Country. Iraq.

2 Description of weapons system. HS 1182 (Hawk). This aircraft is designed for the training of pilots in jet flying and navigational and weapons procedures and can be used for basic and advanced jet flying training.

3 Security classification of equipment. Unclassified.

4 Value of sale. The aircraft are approximately £800,000 each and the Iraqis require within the region of 30.

5 Further information:- The aircraft is made by Hawker Siddeley.

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

noted ES.
BA 1 August.

Yours sincerely

Christine Lamb.

E.M.A.

Copies to:- Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (C team)

Confidential

Reference..........................................

79

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
18 JUL 1974
MBR10/1

Mr. Godfrey Good.

(MED)

## Cymbeline for Iraq.

I have now heard from the Secretary of the Release of Military Information & Equipment Sub Committee that the MOD members are prepared to release this equipment to Iraq in the last quarter of 1976 ie 18 months after its in-service date with the British Army.

2. Defence Intelligence had discounted the likelihood that the equipment would find its way to the Dhofar rebels as remote.

3. I understand that AUS (Sales) has made the point which MOD may well follow up in a further letter to us, that we should sound out the Shah before entering into any commitment to supply Iraq.

M R McIntosh.
Defence Dept.

17. 7. 74.

I.A. 18/7

Mr Raftery

Ext A

R 18/7

(80)

BD 18/7 (17)

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT

P.O. BOX NO. 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE, ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL

Telex : 883601 Telephone : 01-606 6699

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 43
17 JUL 1974
MTM3/359/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 35
19 JUL 1974
NBR10/1

[illegible] Rich Esq
H M Treasury
Great George Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG

Your reference

Our reference
SP/A/36190/8146

Date
17 July 1974

Dear [illegible]

IRAQ - CYMBELINE RADARS

We have been approached by EMI Electronics Ltd for cover on a sale of 12 Cymbeline radars to the Iraquis. Contract value is £3.745m. Delivery will be 12 - 21 months. Terms proposed are 40% with order, and the balance CAD/ILC.

We shall be grateful to have your authority to cover this business under Section 2 provided of course a licence is obtained.

Yours sincerely

D M Jeffrey

cc G M Lambert - Bank of England
T J Wilshire - ODM
S N Chilton - DOT
E R C Holland - FCO
R J Sanders - MOD
J W Coggins } ECGD
A A Sapsted }

Copy sent to G.S. Burton (MOD) WRZ

P/A

81

1. MED to enter

2. Mr Rafferty

I have told Sales Supply that this will have to wait ministerial policy on arms sales to Iraq a 'general' first-

Good. Note that [illegible] N.D. in meantime. 18/7.

R 19/7

From: W L Wood, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1.

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date 16 July, 1974.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 35
19 JUL 1974

MB R10/1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27
18 JUL 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh,

AIRFIELD LANDING MAT - IRAQ

1. The British Aluminium Company Ltd. (BACO) of Redditch, Worcestershire, have commercial exploitation rights in the above matting, known officially as "extruded aluminium panels for the surfacing of airfields", or PSA (Prefabricated Surfacing Aluminium).

2. The mat is comprised of 3 lb and 4 lb panels. The 3 lb panels were designed by the Military Vehicles and Engineering Establishment, Christchurch, and have been taken into official Service use for the following roles:

a. Medium Range Transport (MRT) Runways
b. Forward Operating Pads for VTOL Aircraft
c. Engine Test Pads

The 3 lb version can accommodate single wheel weights of 30,000 lbs. with tyre pressures 80-100 psi and a California Bearing Rate (CBR) of 6%.

3. There is no specific Service requirement at present for a 4 lb panel. However, as a sales venture with MOD concurrence BACO using basic MVEE(c) design information made a panel to take single wheel weights of 20,000 lbs. with tyre pressures of up to 215 psi and a CBR of 8% which was given simulated tests by MVEE(c). The 4 lb panel can be sued to reinforce the 3 lb version which is prone to damage when used on soft ground, thus extending its useful life. It should also be able to take light aircraft and fighters.

4. It is the intention that Fairey Engineering Ltd. (FEL) of Stockport, Cheshire, will act as agents for BACO in the supply to the Iraq MOD of two runways each of three kilometre length made up of two-thirds 3 lb panel and one-third (the centre strip) of 4 lb panel. The mats would therefore appear to be caught under Group 1 of the Export of Good (Control) Order 1970:

> "Appliances for use with arms and apparatus specially designed and intended for land, sea or aerial warfare"

May political and other clearances as might be necessary be given for this proposed sale please which is likely to be in the region of a £3M order.

....... 5. FEL/

From: W L Wood, Sales Supply 5b, Room 1144

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation*
St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext

---

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/523/10/12

Date

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
London, SW1

---

5. FEL have asked for a very early reply if possible please.

Yours sincerely,
Les Wood.

Copy to:

Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
MOD Defence Policy Staff
DTI (EPB)
Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept)
Sales Supply 5a
Sales 1b

(82)

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT

BOX NO. 272, ALDERMANBURY HOUSE, ALDERMANBURY, LONDON EC2P 2EL

Telex : 884601 Telephone : 01-606 6699

I E Rich Esq
HM Treasury
Great George Street
LONDON
SW1P 3AG

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 43
16 JUL 1974
MTA 3/359/1

Your reference

Our reference
SP/A/44401/8167
Date
15 July 1974

Dear

MOBILE RUNWAY - IRAQ - FAIREY ENGINEERING

We have been approached by Fairey Engineering for cover on a supplier credit basis on the sale of a Mobile Runway to the Ministry of Defence Iraq. The Runway consists of aluminium planks, and the contract value is £3m. Terms proposed are 20% with order 80% CAD/CHG. Delivery is expected to take place over 6 to 26 months from date of contract.

We shall be grateful for your approval to take this business under Section 2.

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REGISTRY No 35
23 JUL 1974
NBR 10/1

Yours sincerely

D M Jaffray

cc G M Lambert - Bank of England
T J Wilshire - CDM
S N Chilton - DoT
E R C Holland - FCO
R J Sanders - MOD
J W Coggins)
A A Sapsted) ECGD

Copy sent to GS Burton (MED)

16/7

Mr Jaffray. - Is this alright in terms of the OPD paper.

~~Mr Holland FRED~~

What do you think? No MED objection?

22/7

Discussed with Mr Williams and agreed to allow this to proceed since it did not indicate approval to the sale in any way. R.M.I [illegible] from Defence Sales that the matter is up for consideration by Ministers.

E.H.A. 22/7

1

(83)

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 43
22 JUL 1974

**Treasury Chambers**
Great George Street London SW1P 3AG

Telex 262405 Telephone 01-930 1234 ext

D M Jaffray Esq
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Aldermanbury House
Aldermanbury
London
EC2P 2EL

Your reference
SP/A/44401/8167
Our reference
2F(E) 17-180-01
Date
19 July 1974

~~RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 33
23 JUL 1974~~

NBR 10/1

(82)

E MA

MOBILE RUNWAY - IRAQ

Your letter of 15 July notified Departments of the request from Fairey Engineering for supplier credit cover for the sale of a mobile runway to the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.

I confirm that the Treasury has no objections to the proposed sale and that this business may be notated to the Section 2 arms account.

A SCOTT

Mr. Boton (MED).

cc
G M Lambert B/E
T J Wilshire ODM
S N Chilton DOT
E R C Holland FCO
R J Sanders MOD

Secretary of State.

NBR 10/1 CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
29 JUL 1974
NBR 10/1

Mr ~~Weir~~ Mr Acland

cpy in crew ✓

## DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1 In his minute of 12 July to the Secretary of State, Mr Acland mentioned that the general question of arms sales to Iraq would be referred shortly to the DOP Committee.

2 I now submit a draft paper which it is hoped will be taken by the DOP Committee at their next meeting on Thursday, 26 July. NENAD are submitting a separate paper on sales to Syria.

3 We have considered with NENAD whether it would be better to amalgamate these two subjects into one paper. In view, however, of the different considerations (eg: Iran, Kuwait and the Kurds) which apply in the case of Iraq and since Iraq has not previously been discussed by Ministers in this context, I think it is right to treat the two questions separately.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

19 July 1974

cc: NENAD
Defence Department

I agree with the draft, which I think embodies the right degree of caution.

M R Weir
19/7

CONFIDENTIAL

This seems allright but

I'm unclear what "consulting the

Sounding out.

Shah" means!

No. Do we ask him to agree?

or If he expresses doubts, do we

refuse?

Possibly. Depending on the strength of reaction

And why do we ask him?

And what wld. be the result if

we didnt?

Because he would get to hear & would react v. badly if we didnt. Our relations with the Shah are infinitely more importantant than with Iraq

23/7

I have talked to Mr Wright. It is really a question of sounding out the Shah and getting a reaction to enable us to make a decision. The draft has been amended. 23/7

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Rafferty (NFD)
R 25/7.

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29 JUL 1974
NBR10/1

Agree
26/7

**SECRETARY OF STATE**

**Defence Sales to Iraq**

w(84) On the draft DOP paper you commented:- "This seems all right but (a) I am not sure what 'consulting the Shah' means; (b) Do we ask him to agree; (c) If he expresses doubts do we refuse?; (d) Why do we ask him and (e) What would be the result if we did not?".

2. I have talked to Mr. Wright (Middle East Department). The answers are:-

(a) It means sounding out;

(b) No

(c) Possibly - depending on the strength of his reaction;

(d)&(e) Because the Shah would get to hear of it and it takes very little to awaken his suspicions of what we are up to in Iraq. He would react very badly if he did not know in advance. Our interests in Iran and therefore our relations with the Shah are infinitely more important to us than Iraq

/It is

CONFIDENTIAL

3. It is thus a question of sounding out the Shah and getting a reaction to enable us to make a final decision. The draft has been amended in this sense.

4. Time is so short that we might have to try to deal with this out of Committee. Do you mind?

24 July, 1974

REC D IN
REC No 35
29 JUL 1974
NBR 10/1

TOP COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

IA. 9/8

GRS 30

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270920Z JULY.

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 290800Z JULY.

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TEL NO 265 OF 27 JULY 1974.

50

OUR TELEGRAM NO 215 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. AS I EXPECT TO BE QUESTIONED ABOUT THIS VERY SHORTLY, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR INSTRUCTIONS.

GIDDENS

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(88)

IMMEDIATE

SKBY 301600Z

CYPHER/CAT-A-

FM FCO 291140Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 301600Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
31 JUL 1974
NBR10/1

TOP COPY

IA 2918.

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 173 OF 29/7/74.

(87)

YRTELNO. 265: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, POLICY IS AT PRESENT BEING CONSIDERED BY MINISTERS. WE HOPE FOR A DECISION NOT LATER THAN 2 AUGUST.

2. YOU SHOULD, IF THE SUBJECT CANNOT BE AVOIDED, TAKE THE LINE THAT YOU AWAIT INSTRUCTIONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NENAD

a MGD

88

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

2

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
-2 AUG 1974

NBR 10/1

30 July, 1974

Mr Clark 1/7

Mr Rafferty 1/8

Enter.

PS 1/8

Dear Richard,

Defence Sales to Syria and Iraq

I write to inform you that the Prime Minister has studied the two memoranda circulated to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (OPD)(74) 26 and 27): and that Mr. Wilson is in agreement with the recommendations made, subject to any views of his colleagues on the Committee.

(86)

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Private Secretaries of Ministers represented on the Committee and to Brearley (Cabinet Office).

Yours ever

Tom Bridges

R.N. Dales, Esq.,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

CONFIDENTIAL

(125) refs

GPS 30

90

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IMMEDIATE

CYPHER/CAT A

(NBR 10/1)

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REGISTRY No. 35
- 6 AUG 1974
NBR 10/1

TOP COPY

FM FCO 051820Z

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 060400Z

TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 322 OF 5 AUGUST 1974 INFO KUWAIT, BAGHDAD, JEDDA.

YOUR TELNO 324: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. MINISTERS HAVE AGREED THAT YOU SHOULD TEST THE SHAH'S REACTIONS ABOUT CYMBELINE AND THE HAWK TRAINER/LIGHT GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT BEFORE ANY FINAL DECISION ON THE SALE OF EITHER EQUIPMENT IS TAKEN. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THEIR INCLINATION IS TO REFUSE AN EXPORT LICENCE FOR CYMBELINE BECAUSE ALTHOUGH BASICALLY A DEFENSIVE AID IT COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT USE AGAINST THE KURDS: MOREOVER THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES ARE INTERESTED IN BUYING IT. ON THE OTHER HAND, CYMBELINE WAS DEVELOPED AS A COLLABORATIVE VENTURE BETWEEN HMG AND INDUSTRY AND THERE IS AN OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT THE MANUFACTURER IN EXPORT SALES. ON HAWK, WHILE THERE ARE RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE NUMBERS INVOLVED, IT IS NOT THOUGHT LIKELY THAT THE IRAQIS WOULD CONVERT THE TRAINER VERSION INTO A LIGHT GROUND ROLE WHEN THEY ALREADY POSSESS RUSSIAN HIGH-PERFORMANCE AIRCRAFT FOR THIS PURPOSE AND IF THE IRANIANS DO NOT RAISE OBJECTIONS, THEY WOULD BE INCLINED TO AGREE TO SUPPLY.

2. WHEN YOU NEXT SEE THE SHAH THEREFORE (POSSIBLY WHEN ACCOMPANYING SIR L SUFFIELD), YOU SHOULD SAY THAT WE ARE AT THE MOMENT CONSIDERING AN IRAQI REQUEST FOR 12 CYMBELINE MORTAR LOCATING RADARS AND 30 HAWK AIRCRAFT. GIVEN THE IRAQIS' RECORD, HMG INTEND TO MAINTAIN A VERY RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON THE PROVISION OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT TO THEM, LIMITING SUPPLIES TO RELATIVELY MINOR ITEMS. THE EQUIPMENT UNDER CONSIDERATION IS RELATIVELY MINOR IN A MILITARY

/SENSE BUT

CONFIDENTIAL

101 refers

SENSE BUT NONETHELESS WE HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ALLOWING EITHER SALE. THE CYMBELINE RADAR COULD BE OF SIGNIFICANT USE AGAINST THE KURDS. ON HAWK, THIRTY AIRCRAFT IS A SIZEABLE NUMBER AND THE EXPORT VERSION HAS A LIGHT GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY, THOUGH IT IS SUBSONIC AND PRIMARILY DESIGNED AS A TRAINER AIRCRAFT: MOREOVER DELIVERY WOULD NOT COMMENCE FOR OVER TWO YEARS. BEFORE TAKING A FIRM DECISION ON EITHER SALE WE SHOULD LIKE TO KNOW THE SHAH'S VIEWS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DS 13 MOD
MOD SALES

Copy No. 3 of 32 copies.

NENAD

(91)

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE WHITEHALL LONDON SW1A 2HB
TELEPHONE 01-930 7022

I agree RK 1/8

~~Mr Rider~~ Yes introduce Mr WGR.
also Mr Harris para 4

I think it best to "inform" (see Mr R's manuscript note) Kuwait - do you still agree?
PKW 8/8

MED

Mr Whitten → Mr Clark
~~Mr~~ Wright

I agree too
5/

Entered.

I. Walley 1/8

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
8 AUG 1974
MBR10 | 1

SECRET

MO 26/9/5

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY

## DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ:

## OPD(74)26 AND OPD(74)27

(86)

I am in broad agreement with what you propose in your OPD papers on defence sales to Syria and Iraq. I do however have the following comments.

2. Once our OPD colleagues have endorsed your proposals in principle I will arrange for the detailed examination of the specific items proposed for sale in order to ensure that there are no operational or security problems in the case of Syria. I can say now that there would be no such objections to the supply of Cymbeline or armoured ambulances.

3. Since, of the items which the UAE is prepared to fund on behalf of Syria (OPS(74)26: Annex 'A'), only the armoured ambulances can be approved, considerable care will need to be taken in conveying the decision if we are not to give offence to the UAE. Our Ambassador to the UAE might perhaps present the decision as a package with the implication that the UAE might wish to assist in the purchase of those items which we are able to supply.

4. While fully supporting the need to consult the Shah on sales to Iraq, I doubt the wisdom of 'informing' the Kuwaitis of our intentions. Negotiations for the supply of 36 Jaguar aircraft to Kuwait are about to commence to be followed soon after by negotiations for the supply of Chieftain tanks. We should therefore perhaps not gratuitously invite their strictures and possibly arouse their suspicions, quite unintentionally, by our openness. Should they raise the matter we can assure them that only innocuous items are being supplied.

I still think we should inform the Kuwaitis, though we can be flexible over when we do so, i.e. after the Jaguar & Chieftain negotiations are out of the way.
R 1/8

5. As suggested in paragraph 8 of OPD(74)27, the Hawk, in its export version, is fitted for use as a light strike aircraft. I agree that there is no reason for Iraq to buy it specifically for use in this role since they already have adequate capability in the shape of Russian strike/ground attack aircraft, although it would represent an increased capability. I agree that in this respect we should be guided by the reaction of the Iranians. I would only add that once approval in principle is given to the supply of this aircraft it will be necessary for me to arrange for the detailed ✓ examination of the specification and delivery times being offered, to confirm that these do not conflict with RAF requirements.

/6.

SECRET

SECRET

(102) refers
(104) ..

6. I am copying this minute to the Prime Minister and the members of the OPD, and Sir John Hunt.

R.M.

31st July, 1974.

COPY No. 1

92

Secretary of State for Industry
1 Victoria Street
London SW1H OET

01-222 7877

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REGISTRY No 35
-8 AUG 1974
MBR10/1

Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Whitehall
London SW1

2 August 1974

Dear Jim:

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ: OPD(74)24 AND OPD(74)27

I am generally content that you should act as you propose in your papers. At the moment, however, the Syrians are very close to deciding on the purchase of wide-bodied aircraft. We have been emphasising our interest in the Tristar, and it is clear that the decision is very finely balanced. It would be most unfortunate if we took any action which was liable to tip the balance against us. I would therefore ask that you should not allow our decisions on defence sales to become known until the Syrians have decided one way or the other on the Tristar.

Tony

A W BENN

CONFIDENTIAL

93

GRS 150

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-8 AUG 1974
NBR10/1

TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A

Ent A.
7/8

FM KUWAIT 070630Z AUG

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 475 OF 7 AUGUST 1974/RFI TO ROUTINE TEHRAN, BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.

YRTELNO 322 TO TEHRAN: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. ALTHOUGH I DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSULT THE KUWAITIS ABOUT THE IRAQIS' REQUEST FOR CYMBELINE AND HAWK WE SHOULD INFORM THEM OF OUR DECISION ( AND ESPECIALLY IF WE AGREE TO SUPPLY THESE ITEMS) BEFORE THERE IS ANY DANGER OF THE NEWS BECOMING PUBLIC. AS YOU KNOW THE KUWAITIS ARE OBSESSED WITH ALL THINGS IRAQI AND INSTICTIVELY SUSPICIOUS OF OUR RELATIONS WITH BAGHDAD. IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO KEEP THEM INFORMED OF DEVELOPEMENTS THERE.

2. IF WE DECIDE TO REFUSE EXPORT LICENCES, WE SHOULD ALSO LET THE KUWAITIS KNOW, EXPLAINING OUR DECISION ON THE LINES OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF YOU TUR. THEY WOULD WLCOME OUR FRANKNESS AND THE IMPLICATION THAT BY REFUSING TO SUPPLY A PLANE WITH A GROUND ATTACK CAPABILITY WE HAD THEIR INTERESTS IN MIND COULD EARN US CONSIDERABLE CREDIT.

it would only be by implication
7/8

LAMB

FILES

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR WEIR
MR CAMPBELL

COPIES TO:

DS13, MOD
MOD SALES

CONFIDENTIAL

From: H R Braden, Head of DS 13

Enl A.

7/8

REGISTERED IN
REGISTRY No 35
-8 AUG 1974
MBR10/1

SECRET

(94)

Mr Raftery

, Room 0203,

J E Jackson Esq
Defence Department
Room MS 17
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street (East)
London SW1A 2AL

xxxxxxxxx D/DS 13/174
D/DS 13/178
D/DS 13/709/19
D/DS 13/709/62

7/8

2 August 1974

(91)

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ:
OPD(74)26 AND OPD(74)27

You will have seen my Secretary of State's letter of 31 July agreeing with the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's proposals in the above two papers. I understand the Prime Minister has also agreed.

2. There are two points I should make in amplification of the broad Ministry of Defence agreement; these are:

a. Since many of the items which have been agreed for supply are under generic descriptions it would be unwise to announce to the Syrians or the Iranians that these will be supplied since it will be necessary to go through the normal AWP or RMIPC procedures to obtain the necessary MOD clearances for the specific items which it is proposed to supply. This point has of course already been brought to the attention of your department by DS 13b in a minute dated 31 July.

b. With regard to the supply of Cymbeline, both to Iraq and to Syria, I should make it plain that agreement to supply is conditional upon the actual date of delivery being acceptable to the British Army from a security point of view.

3. I am copying this letter to Ian McDonald (D Sales 1), Alex Stirling (Head of DIS(CS)), Brigadier Desmond Rice (BGS(MO)), Patrick Wright (MED) and James Craig (NENAD).

H. R. BRADEN

SECRET

FO 749/ E 65/8

(95)

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-9 AUG 1974
MBR10/1

Ke MED

LLC NR 399/8

PP FCO

RR KUWAIT

RR BAGHDAD

RR JEDDA

GR 150

ADVANCE COPY

[Files]

M. Raftery

Telegram sent: For advice on

ETRA 9/8

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 080915Z AUG

SECRET

TO PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 420 OF 8 AUG RPTD FOR INFO TO KUWAIT BAGHDAD AND JEDDA.

FOLLOWING FROM ELLINGWORTH IN HM AMBASSADOR'S ABSENCE ON LOCAL LEAVE.

YOUR TEL NO 322 : ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

1. SIR LESTER SUFFIELD AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL BE SEEING THE SHAH TOMORROW ON ANOTHER MATTER, BUT I SHALL NOT BE ACCOMPANYING THEM. IN ANY CASE, IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE THE SHAH ATTACHES TO IRAN-IRAQ RELATIONS, HM AMBASSADOR WOULD CERTAINLY WISH TO BROACH THIS DELICATE MATTER WITH THE SHAH HIMSELF. SUFFIELD FULLY ACCEPTS THIS.

2.

THE SHAH MAY IN FACT BE LESS OPPOSED TO WESTERN SARMS SALES TO IRAQ THAN WE HAD THOUGHT. HM AMBASSADOR'S VIEW WAS THAT WE MUST OBTAIN DIRECT CONFIRMATION FROM THE SHAH HIMSELF THAT THIS IS HIS POSITION.

3. IN VIEW OF THE SHAH'S ABSENCE ON THE CASPIAN, IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE AN AUDIENCE CAN BE ARRANGE. GRATEFUL TO LEARN DATE BY WHICH DECISIONS MUST BE MADE IN LONDON.

PARSONS

CCN PARA 3. CAN BE ARRANGED.

NNNN

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION
3 (4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

discussed with Mr Clark + Mr Williams + agreed that this does not radically alter the situation and that our telegram to Tehran of 8 August covered the situation.

E.H.A. 9/8

Mr Rafferty

This adds urgency to a decision.

9/8

LKS NR 412/8

RR MODUK ARMY

GR 60

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 080930Z

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
-9 AUG 1974
TIBR10/1

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

TO ROUTINE MODUK ARMY TEL NO DIG EBR OF 8 AUGUST.

FOR MDS 1 B FROM LEE: CYMBELINE.

1. I HAVE RECEIVED LETTER FROM DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENT AND SUPPLY, CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFFS OFFICE, ASKING FOR URGENT INFORMATION PRESENT SITUATION RE SUPPLY OF CYMBELINE. IN CONSULTATION WITH CHANCERY, I HAVE REPLIED THAT MATTER IS STILL UNDER STUDY IN LONDON.

GIDDENS

BT

NNNN

TOP COPY

(97)

GPS 50
Priority.

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35
12 AUG 1974
MBR10/1

FM F C O 081725Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY TEHRAN TELNO 331 OF 8 AUGUST 1974, INFO KUWAIT BAGHDAD JEDDA. (95)

1A

12/8

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 420: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. WE AGREE WITH YOU PARAGRAPH 1.

2. THERE IS NO DEADLINE HERE BUT AS E M I ARE PRESSING M O D SALES FOR AN ANSWER ON CYMBELINE A FORECAST OF THE POSSIBLE DATE FOR AN AUDIENCE WOULD BE HELPFUL TO US AND BAGHDAD.

CALLAGHAN.

FILES
MED.
DEFENCE D

COPIES TO
DS 13 } MOD.
SALES 1B }

CONFIDENTIAL

(101) refers

98

**Foreign and Commonwealth Office**
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
15 AUG 1974

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
DEFENCE SALES ORGANISATION
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ST CHRISTOPHER HOUSE

Your reference
Our reference NBR 10/1
Date 13 August 1974

C.A. 15/8

Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ: GUN SPARES

1. Thank you for your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 3 July 1974.

2. There is no political objection to the supply of 25 Pounder Gun Spares to Iraq.

3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely,

Miriam McIntosh.

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department

Speak to Hugh Cameron. ✓ (99)

LH 384E

**MINISTRY OF DEFENCE**
*Defence Sales Organisation* Sales 1b
Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ
Telex 23605
Telephone ~~01 437 9288 ext.~~
Direct Line 01 632 4709
Switchboard 01 632 3333

✓ NB R10/1

Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/113/18/1

Date 12th August 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

May we please have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below?

1 Country Iraq

2 Description LYNX helicopters - troop carrying version

3 Security Classification Unclassified

4 Value of sale 40 at £450,000 each with spares at least £20 million.

5 Further information The helicopter is made by Westlands but is part of an Anglo-French project. (ie French agreement to an export sale is required).

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

H. Cameron.

BU to Mr Rafferty on 3/9/74

Discussed with Miss Laws, Sales 1. She will provide b) in conjunction with a)
19/8.

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M Esau - DS13
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DTI (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS(C Team)

1. MOD to note
2. Mr. Rafferty
Grateful for your comments in due course.

Miss McIntosh I have asked MOD Sales in the first instance for a) a professional assessment as to whether this aircraft can be regarded as minor equipment. If so, we will probably have to submit because of the numbers involved. Meanwhile, would you please find out the b) delivery prospects.

M K McIntosh.
13.8.74.

(100)

Brig G Atkinson/Def. Dept
Mr Campbell/MED
/NENAD

Def Dept to [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

27 AUG 1974

PAYMASTER GENERAL

NBR 10/1

MED to enter

Treasury Chambers, Parliament Street, SW1P 3AG

E + M.A. 21/8

A A Acland Esq
PS/Secretary of State for Foreign
and Commonwealth Affairs
Downing Street
SW1A 2AL

16 August 1974

(86)

Dear Acland,

DEFENCE SALES TO SYRIA AND IRAQ

OPD(74) 26 AND 27

I am writing to you on behalf of the Paymaster General to say that we have no objections to the proposals in these papers.

I am sending copies of this letter to the Private Secretaries of the other Ministers represented on the Committee, and to Chris Brearley (Cabinet Office).

Yours sincerely,

John Beastall

J S BEASTALL

CONFIDENTIAL

# TO BE RETAINED AS TOP ENCLOSURE

## Cabinet Documents

| Folio No. | Reference | Date |
|---|---|---|
| 86 | OPD(74) 27 (plus Draft) | 26/7/1974 |
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**The above-listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file, has/have been removed and destroyed.**

**For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES**

**Signed** G. V. Wightman **Date** 22/1/04.

Arms Working Party Clearances - Sale Of Military Equipment To Iraq And Syria; French Arms Supplies To Iraq. UK Arms Sales To Iraq. 31 Dec. 1973. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2321. Newspaper Cutting. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107472853/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=e58fb70d&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.